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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation consists of two chapters on the internationalization of emerging economy 
firms. I examine the influence of the firm’s corporate governance and political connections on 
the firm’s internationalization behavior, as these factors reflect the special institutional 
environment of emerging economies.  
In the first chapter I analyze the influence of a firm’s corporate governance on its selection 
of host countries. Building on agency theory, I propose that in emerging markets, the governance 
structure of the firm modifies the usual prediction that favorable host-country institutions attract 
foreign direct investment, because the emerging country conditions lead to firm heterogeneity in 
risk preferences and agency problems. Hence, comparing family-controlled and state-controlled 
firms in emerging economies, I hypothesize that family-controlled firms with CEO duality or a 
higher proportion of independent directors on the board are more likely to invest in countries 
with higher institutional quality, while state-controlled firms with such characteristics are less 
likely to do so. These hypotheses are supported by the data on foreign market entries by China’s 
public listed firms in 2004-2013. 
In the second chapter I introduce the upper echelons perspective to study the impact of top 
managers’ political connections on the firm’s degree of internationalization. I differentiate 
between two types of political connections by the top manager: executive connections 
established through current or past working experience in the executive branch of the 
government, and legislative connections established through current or past representational 
appointments in the legislative branch of the government. After comparing the three mechanisms 
(resources, costs, and personal values) through which top managers’ political connections can 
influence the firm’s degree of internationalization, I propose that top managers’ executive 
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connections facilitate the firm’s internationalization, while legislative connections hinder the 
firm’s internationalization. The impact of top managers’ executive and legislative connections is 
weakened by state ownership. Furthermore, I propose that CEO duality strengthens the effects of 
top managers’ political connections on the firm’s degree of internationalization. I find empirical 
support for my theories based on a dataset of 100 publicly traded Chinese firms over the 2004-
2013 period. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
My dissertation examines the internationalization of emerging economy firms. In this 
chapter, I first review the relevant literature and identify the gaps, and then I state my research 
questions, followed by a more detailed description of the two essays in the dissertation.  
1.2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
1.2.1 Literature on FDI Location Choice 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) location choice is an important topic in international 
business (IB), as it has substantial consequences for the survival and overall competitive 
advantage of the multinational enterprise (MNE) (Cantwell, 2009; Dunning, 1998). The 
dominant theories in the IB field provide diverse explanations for the selection of host countries.  
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The eclectic paradigm argues that firms prefer foreign countries that offer superior 
market or production opportunities, or opportunities to obtain inputs for production, such as 
natural resources (Buckley & Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1988, 1998). Along this stream of 
research, scholars have identified a series of economic factors as important determinants of 
inward foreign investment, such as the availability of natural resources, market size, market 
growth, labor cost, exchange rate and infrastructure quality (e.g., Bass, McGregor, & Walters, 
1977; Billington, 1999; Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss, & Zheng, 2007).  
The Uppsala internationalization process model explains the firm’s selection of host 
country based on the psychic distance between host and home countries (Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977). Psychic distance refers to the differences between home and host countries in terms of 
linguistic, institutional, cultural and political factors (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Empirical 
research finds that psychic distance negatively affects the probability of foreign market entry 
(Davidson, 1980), and multinational firms enter culturally proximate market first and then 
gradually move to more distant countries (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996).  
As the institutional theory gains prominence in the IB field (North, 1990), many scholars 
have started to examine the influence of the institutional environment on the MNE’s activities 
(Coeurderoy & Murray, 2008; Globerman & Shapiro, 2002; Henisz, 2000; Slangen & 
Beugelsdijk, 2010). The general arguments in this stream of literature are that institutional 
distance between host and home countries (i.e., the differences between host and home countries 
in terms of cognitive, normative and regulatory dimensions) discourages MNE’s entry (Xu & 
Shenkar, 2002); and that the institutional quality of the host country (i.e., the extent to which 
institutions are well established in the society) has a positive effect on inward foreign investment 
(Fan, Morck, Xu, & Yeung, 2009; Globerman & Shapiro, 2002; Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010).  
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Recent research on emerging economy MNEs (EE MNEs) indicates that the firm’s risk 
preferences, political capabilities, strategic motives and government affiliations might change the 
direction and magnitude of the relationship between institutional quality of the host country and 
MNE’s probability of market entry (Buckley, Devinney, & Louviere, 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra & 
Genc, 2008; Holburn & Zelner, 2010; Li, Li, & Shapiro, 2012; Meyer, Ding, Li, & Zhang, 2014). 
For instance, some scholars find that state-owned firms are less sensitive towards institutional 
hazards in the host country, relative to privately-owned firms (Duanmu, 2014; Ramasamy, 
Yeung, & Laforet, 2012). However, these studies focus on the goal and risk preference of the 
controlling shareholder, and have ignored the potential agency conflicts in the firm’s FDI 
location decision (Ellstrand, Tihanyi, & Johnson, 2002; Strange, Filatotchev, Lien, & Piesse, 
2009), which arise because managers and shareholders have conflicting interests in the selection 
of host countries due to the differences in their goals and risk preferences (Globerman, Peng, & 
Shapiro, 2011; Morck & Yeung, 2014; Sun & Tong, 2003; Zou & Adams, 2008). The first essay 
in my dissertation seeks to address this gap in the literature.  
1.2.2 Literature on Corporate Governance and Internationalization  
Corporate governance refers to the set of “formal structures, informal structures, and 
processes that exist in oversight roles and responsibilities in the corporate context” (Hambrick, 
Werder, & Zajac, 2008, p. 381). Due to imperfect and asymmetric information and a divergence 
of objectives between the shareholders and managers in modern corporations, shareholders have 
to establish monitoring and controlling mechanisms to ensure that their objectives are achieved 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Most researchers in management have primarily focused on the 
influence of three internal governance mechanisms on the firm’s international expansion: 
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managerial incentives, board of directors, and ownership (Aguilera, Desender, Bednar, & Lee, 
2015; Buckley & Strange, 2010).  
In terms of managerial incentives, agency theory suggests that shareholders can reduce 
the agency costs by aligning the interest of the managers with that of shareholders through 
managerial equity ownership and long-term compensation (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Sanders 
and Carpenter (1998) find that the firm’s degree of internationalization is higher when the level 
of chief executive officer (CEO) pay is higher and more long-term. Liu, Lu and Chizema (2014) 
find that top executives’ cash pay and equity ownership is positively associated with the firm’s 
foreign direct investment.  
In terms of board structure, agency theory suggests that directors of the board can 
monitor managers’ activities and protect shareholders’ interests from the corporate management 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Board structure has been found to influence the firm’s 
internationalization decisions (Ellstrand et al., 2002; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998). Ellstrand et al. 
(2002) find that firms with a higher proportion of independent directors, or firms that separate 
the CEO and chairperson positions, are associated with a higher level of political risk in their 
portfolio of foreign investment. Datta et al. (2009) find that firms with such board structures are 
more likely to endorse acquisition over joint ventures in foreign market entries. Sanders and 
Carpenter (1998) find that the separation of chairperson and CEO positions is associated with a 
higher degree of internationalization.  
In terms of ownership, George, Wiklund and Zahra (2005) find that external owners, such 
as venture capitalists and institutional investors, are more likely to increase the firm’s scope of 
internationalization. Ownership by institutional investors is found to be positively related to 
firm’s international diversification (Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 2003). Bhaumik, 
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Driffield and Pal (2009) find that family ownership is negatively associated with 
internationalization, but foreign ownership has a positive effect. Filatotchev, Strange, Piesse and 
Lien (2007) argue that parent firm’s ownership structure is associated with its share ownership in 
overseas subsidiaries. Specifically, they find that family ownership, non-family insider 
ownership and domestic institutional ownership are negatively related to the parent firm’s share 
ownership in its overseas subsidiary, but foreign financial institutional ownership is positively 
associated with the share ownership in subsidiary. In the Chinese context, state ownership has 
been found to affect the firm’s decision to internationalize, degree of internationalization, and the 
selection of host countries (e.g., Duanmu, 2014; Liang, Ren, & Sun, 2014; Pan, Teng, Supapol, 
Lu, Huang, & Wang, 2014; Ramasamy et al., 2012).  
The comparative corporate governance literature shows that the monitoring role of the 
board is contingent upon the ownership structure of the firm (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; 
Desender, Aguilera, Crespi, & GarcÍa-cestona, 2013; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). This is 
because concentrated ownership increases block shareholders’ incentive and ability to play an 
active monitoring role, and also because different types of investors pursue different interests. 
However, in the literature on corporate governance and internationalization, there is still a lack of 
understanding of how the ownership structure and board structure of the firm jointly determine 
the firm’s decision to internationalize.  
The literature has shown that corporate governance is markedly different in emerging 
economies relative to that in advanced economies (Desender, Aguilera, Lópezpuertas-Lamy, & 
Crespi, 2016; Jiang & Kim, 2015; Luo, Chung, & Sobczak, 2009). In the US and UK context, 
corporate governance is featured by dispersed ownership, and the main agency conflict is 
between managers and shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, in the emerging economy 
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context, due to ownership concentration and an underdeveloped institutional environment, there 
are conflicts both between managers and shareholders, and between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). In addition, most 
publicly listed firms are controlled by family block shareholders or state block shareholders (Fan, 
Wong, & Zhang, 2007; Luo et al., 2009; Sun & Tong, 2003). These special features challenge 
the traditional predictions of agency theory, and require a more refined model to explain the 
firm’s risk preferences and internationalization decisions. The current literature in the emerging 
economy context has mostly focused on the impact of ownership on the firm’s 
internationalization (Bhaumik et al., 2009; Duanmu, 2014; Filatotchev et al., 2007), but very few 
studies have investigated the impact of the board structure on the firm’s internationalization.  
Therefore, in the literature on corporate governance and internationalization, I have 
identified two gaps: First, the role of board structure on firm’s internationalization should be 
interpreted based on the specific type of ownership; second, there are very few studies that 
investigate the impact of board structure on the firm’s internationalization in the emerging 
economy context.  
1.2.3 Literature on Top Management Team and Internationalization  
The top management team is an important corporate governance actor (Aguilera et al., 
2015). The current literature in IB extends the upper echelons perspective to explain the role of 
top management team on the firm’s internationalization. Prior findings suggest that elite 
education, younger age, heterogeneity and international experience of the top management team 
are associated with higher levels of internationalization, because these factors reflect the top 
management team’s risk propensity, cognitive base, capability to process diverse information 
and access to resources (Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001; Reuber & Fischer, 1997; Tihanyi, 
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Ellstrand, Daily, & Dalton, 2000). However, given that all of these studies are conducted in the 
advanced economy context, it is unclear how the top management team affects the firm’s 
internationalization in the emerging economy context (Qian, Cao, & Takeuchi, 2013).  
In addition, recent studies in the upper echelons literature have shown that top managers 
can imprint their personal values into the organizational decision making process (Chin et al., 
2013; Li & Liang, 2014). For instance, Christensen, Dhaliwal, Boivie and Graffin (2015) find 
that firms run by more politically conservative managers are more risk-averse in their strategies 
than more liberal managers. However, the current IB literature has not explored the personal 
values of top managers on the firm’s internationalization behavior.  
The upper echelons theory suggests that the relationship between the attributes of the top 
management team and the firm’s strategic outcomes is contingent upon the discretional power of 
the managers (Chin et al., 2013; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). The discretional power of 
managers refers to the freedom that top managers are granted in taking actions within the 
organization (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). According to agency theory, managers’ relative 
power in the firm is constrained by the board of directors (Eisenhardt, 1989). In addition, 
managers’ discretional power can differ significantly because of firm ownership and national 
context (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007). However, prior literature on top management team and 
the firm’s internationalization has not identified the boundary conditions for the managers’ 
values/characteristics to enter into the firm’s strategic decisions. 
In sum, in the literature on top management teams and internationalization, I have 
identified three gaps: First, these is a lack of understanding regarding the role of top management 
teams in the emerging economy context; second, the political activities of top managers as 
indicators of managers’ personal values are relatively underexplored in the IB context; and third, 
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there is a lack of understanding regarding the boundary conditions for the relationship between 
the attributes of the top management team and the firm’s internationalization.  
1.2.4 Home Country Institutional Environment and Internationalization of EE MNEs  
MNEs are embedded in their home country, which is why the institutional environment 
of the home country has an important influence on the firm’s strategies (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; 
Luo et al., 2009; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). The influence of the home country institutional 
environment on the firm’s internationalization strategy is especially important for emerging 
economy MNEs, because most of them do not have the firm ownership advantage that facilitates 
their internationalization (Rugman & Nguyen, 2014), and their successful internationalization 
reflects the influence of factors, such as home government support, entrepreneurial leadership, 
and home country culture traits (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Contractor, 2013; Cui & Jiang, 2012; 
Luo & Tung, 2007). In this dissertation, I identify two special features shaped by the 
underdeveloped and network-based institutional environment in the emerging economies: 
corporate governance and political connections.  
Corporate governance is embedded in the specific institutional context (Aguilera & 
Jackson, 2003; Luo et al., 2009). In emerging economies, corporate governance is featured by 
concentrated ownership, weak protection for shareholder rights, and control by family, state and 
business groups in publicly listed firms (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Dharwadkar, 
George, & Brandes, 2000; Young et al., 2008). Luo and Yung (2007) suggest that corporate 
governance in emerging economies can be a hindrance for the internationalization of EE MNEs, 
because EE MNEs might be perceived to be less accountable, transparent and trustworthy due to 
poor corporate governance. There are many studies that examine the influence of ownership 
structure on the firm’s internationalization strategies (e.g., Bhaumik et al., 2009; Duanmu, 2014; 
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Meyer et al., 2014), but there is relatively little understanding regarding the influence of other 
internal governance mechanisms, such as the board of directors and managerial incentives on the 
firm’s internationalization.  
Another special feature of emerging economies is the predominant role of the 
government in the business sector (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Shi, Markoczy, & Stan, 2014). 
Many studies show that state ownership affects the firm’s internationalization strategies, such as 
FDI location choice, entry mode, equity ownership in the subsidiary and degree of 
internationalization (e.g., Cui & Jiang, 2012; Kang & Jiang, 2012; Meyer et al., 2014), but very 
few studies investigate how managers’ political connections affect the firm’s internationalization 
(Liang et al., 2014; Pan et al., 2014). Top managers build political connections through current or 
past experience of holding positions in the government, and this personal political engagement 
should directly reflect the manager’s personal values (Chin et al., 2013; Hambrick & Mason, 
1984; Li & Liang, 2014). However, prior research tends to focus on the economic or social costs 
and benefits of political connections, and neglect the implication of political connections on 
managers’ personal values.  
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Specifically, this dissertation addresses the following research questions: (1) What is the 
role of governance structure in MNE’s selection of host country? (2) What is the effect of top 
managers’ political connections and the firm’s governance structure on the firm’s degree of 
internationalization? The common theme under these two questions is the influence of corporate 
governance actors (i.e., top management team, controlling and minority shareholders, and board 
of directors) and the internal governance mechanisms (board structure and ownership structure) 
on the firm’s internationalization.  
  
10 
 
1.3.1 Chapter Two 
In this Chapter, I explain how board and ownership characteristics influence emerging 
market firms’ FDI location choice. 
Agency theorists argue that the representation of independent board members and the 
separation of CEO and chair positions of the board can mitigate agency costs through enhanced 
board vigilance (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983), and thereby encourage firms to 
assume a higher level of risk in international investments (Ellstrand et al., 2002). However, the 
comparative corporate governance literature shows that the monitoring role of the board is 
contingent upon ownership structure of the firm (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Desender et al., 
2013; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000), because concentrated ownership increases the block 
shareholders’ incentive and ability to play an active monitoring role, and different types of 
investors pursue different interests. Therefore, building on prior literature on corporate 
governance and internationalization, I investigate how the types of controlling shareholder 
(family vs. state) in the publicly listed firm moderates the impact of board structure on the firm’s 
selection of host countries.  
Agency theory is concerned with the conflict between top managers and all shareholders 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). As top managers are more risk-averse than dispersed shareholders, a stronger 
board ensures the top management team takes on more risks in the firm’s strategies (Datta et al., 
2009; Deutsch, 2005). In addition to top managers and dispersed shareholders, there are two 
additional corporate governance actors in the emerging economy context: family and state 
controlling shareholders. When I conceptualize the degree of risk-aversion on a continuous scale, 
the family owner is the most risk-averse, followed by top managers, minority shareholders and 
the state.  
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Therefore, a stronger board, characterized by a higher representation of independent 
directors and the separation of CEO and chair positions, does not necessarily lead to more risk-
taking in the context of foreign investments. I conduct an analysis of the risk preferences of all 
corporate governance actors and the monitoring role of the board. Based on the results, I argue 
that a higher representation of independent directors in family-controlled firms increases the 
likelihood of entering foreign countries with high institutional quality, while for state controlled 
firms the likelihood is decreased. The separation of CEO and chair positions in family controlled 
firms decreases the likelihood of entering foreign countries with high institutional quality, while 
for state-controlled firms the likelihood is increased. I test these ideas on a comprehensive 
sample of foreign market entries by publicly listed Chinese firms in 2004-2013, and find strong 
empirical support for the hypotheses.  
This essay contributes to two strands of literature. First, I add to the literature on the 
governance structure of the firm and its internationalization strategies (Bhaumik et al., 2009; 
Datta et al., 2009; Filatotchev et al., 2007), by being one of the first to analyze how the 
ownership of the firm interacts with internal governance mechanisms to determine FDI location 
choice. As I mentioned before, some studies have discussed how internal governance affects FDI 
location choice, while others have analyzed differences between family- and state-owned firms. 
Both of these approaches have important drawbacks. The former approach does not consider the 
fact that the monitoring role of the board is affected by the ownership structure of the firm, 
whereas the latter approach ignores the possibility that the controlling shareholder exert their 
goals and preferences for the firm via the board and the top management team. Therefore, it is 
necessary to explain how the interaction of board structure and ownership structure affects firms’ 
FDI locations.  
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Second, I contribute to agency theory by integrating two approaches: The first highlights 
the problems that arise from conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders and the 
various mechanisms designed to mitigate these conflicts (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976), while the second focuses on the differences in objectives and agency problems 
among firms with different dominant shareholders (Cuervo-Cazurra, Inkpen, Musacchio, & 
Ramaswamy, 2014; Young et al., 2008). I explain how these two agency relationships interact 
with each other in the context of emerging market firms. The underdeveloped institutional 
environment and the unique ownership structure of emerging economy MNEs require a 
modification of some of the traditional agency arguments, because emerging economies are 
characterized by higher levels of information asymmetries, less sophisticated regulation and 
worse contractual enforcement. My findings provide a better understanding of how some of the 
unique characteristics of emerging economy MNEs that arise from the influence of their country 
of origin, affect the MNE’s internationalization (Lu, Liu, Wright, & Filatotchev, 2014; Luo & 
Tung, 2007; Meyer et al., 2014; Morck, Yeung, & Zhao, 2008).  
1.3.2 Chapter Three 
Top management team is a key corporate governance actor (Aguilera et al., 2015). In this 
essay, I examine the influence of top management team’s political connections and the 
moderating effect of the firm’s internal governance mechanisms (ownership and board structure) 
on the firm’s degree of internationalization.  
Generally, the literature on top managers’ political connections suggests that political 
connections affect organizational outcomes by providing resources in various forms (e.g., bank 
loans, relaxed regulatory oversight, privileged access to information, and political expertise), or 
by exposing the firm to government intervention (e.g., imposing government policies and 
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political goals) (Faccio, 2006; Fan et al., 2007; Pan et al., 2014; Shi et al., 2014). These studies’ 
focus on the economic or social costs and benefits of political connections neglects the influence 
of political connections on the top manager’s personal values. Top managers’ personal values 
refer to “a broad tendency to prefer certain states of affairs over others” (Hofstede, 1980: 19). 
Drawing from the upper echelons perspective, I propose that top managers build political 
connections through current or past experience of holding positions in the government, and this 
personal political engagement should directly reflect the manager’s personal values (Chin et al., 
2013; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Li & Liang, 2014).  
I differentiate between two types of political connections by the top manager: i) executive 
connections established by working in the executive branch of the government and ii) legislative 
connections established by holding a representational appointment in the legislative branch of the 
government. These political activities reflect different personal values. I argue that top managers’ 
executive connections in privately-owned firms indicate that these managers are more receptive 
to changes and willing to take risks, whereas top manager’s executive connections in state-
owned firms indicate that they emphasize stability and authority (Ralston, Terpstra-Tong, 
Terpstra, Wang, & Egri, 2006). In contrast, top managers’ legislative connections in both state 
and privately owned firms reflect the manager’s pro-social value (Li & Liang, 2014), that is, the 
motive to serve and benefit the larger society.  
Integrating the personal value view with the resource and state control views of top 
managers’ political connections, I propose that these two types of top managers’ political 
connections can influence the firm’s degree of internationalization by bringing different levels of 
resources to the firm, exposing the firm to different levels of state control and injecting different 
personal values of the top managers into the firm’s strategic choice. After comparing the three 
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mechanisms, I argue that top managers’ executive connections facilitate the firm’s 
internationalization, whereas legislative connections hinder the firm’s internationalization. 
Furthermore, I propose two moderators for the relationship between top managers’ 
political connections and the firm’s degree of internationalization: ownership type and the dual 
role of chief executive officer (CEO) and chairman of the board. Ownership type affects the 
strength and direction of the relationship between top managers’ political connections and the 
firm’s degree of internationalization through its influence on resources, state control, and 
managers’ personal values in the organization. Specifically, I argue that executive connections 
have a positive impact on the firm’s degree of internationalization in privately owned firms, but 
the effect is much weaker in state owned firms. Legislative connections have a negative impact 
on the firm’s degree of internationalization in privately owned firms, but the effect is much 
weaker in state owned firms.  
CEO duality refers to the practice that the CEO of the firm also chairs the board 
(Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994). CEO duality reduces the constraints of the board over the top 
managers’ actions, and thereby provides greater freedom for top managers to inject their personal 
values into the firm’s strategic choices (Chin et al., 2013). Therefore, I predict that CEO duality 
strengthens the relationship between top managers’ political connections and the firm’s degree of 
internationalization. These conjectures are confirmed by an empirical test based on a dataset of 
100 publicly traded Chinese firms over the 2004-2013 periods.  
This essay makes two major contributions. First, it contributes to the current literature on 
top managers’ political connections by adding the upper echelons perspective. I propose that top 
managers’ political connections affect firm strategies through three interrelated mechanisms: i) 
resources, ii) cost, and iii) managers’ personal values. The third mechanism is very important, as 
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it explains why managers with executive connections and managers with legislative connections 
have opposing preferences for internationalization; and why existing research that does not 
differentiate between the types of managers’ political connections has not found any significant 
relationship between top managers’ political connections and the firm’s degree of 
internationalization. Second, I contribute to the upper echelons literature. IB scholars have found 
that top management team’s demographic attributes, composition and international experience 
affects the firm’s internationalization strategies (Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001; Lee & Park, 
2008; Reuber & Fischer, 1997; Tihanyi et al., 2000). I add to this literature by establishing the 
relationship between top managers’ political connections and the firm’s degree of 
internationalization. In addition, I extend the upper echelons literature by examining the impact 
of top management team on internationalization in an emerging collective and socialist country.  
The dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I examine the impact of corporate 
governance on the firm’s selection of host countries. In Chapter 3, I study the influence of top 
management team’s political connections and firm’s governance structure on the firm’s degree of 
internationalization. Finally, in Chapter 4, I conclude with a discussion of the results. 
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CHAPTER TWO: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FDI LOCATION CHOICE  
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The location choice of foreign direct investment (FDI) is an important topic in 
international business research as it has substantial consequences for the performance and 
survival of multinational firms. The existing literature suggests that host country institutional 
environment is a major consideration in the MNE’s FDI location choice (Cantwell, 2009; 
Dunning, 1998). It is generally accepted that institutional quality, i.e., the extent to which market 
supporting institutions are well developed in the country, tend to result in higher levels of inward 
FDI because well-established institutions reduce the risk and uncertainty in the market and 
facilitate business transactions (e.g., Coeurderoy & Murray, 2008; Delios & Henisz, 2003; 
García-Canal & Guillén, 2008; Globerman & Shapiro, 2002; Henisz, 2000; Slangen & 
Beugelsdijk, 2010).   
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Recent research on emerging economy MNEs (EE MNEs) indicates that firm’s risk 
preferences, political capabilities, strategic motives and government affiliations might change the 
direction and magnitude of the relationship between institutional quality of the host country and 
MNE’s probability of market entry (Buckley, Devinney, & Louviere, 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra & 
Genc, 2008; Holburn & Zelner, 2010; Li, Li, & Shapiro, 2012; Meyer, Ding, Li, & Zhang, 2014). 
For instance, some scholars find that state owned firms are less sensitive towards institutional 
hazards in the host country, relative to privately owned firms (Duanmu, 2014; Ramasamy, 
Yeung, & Laforet, 2012). However, these studies have ignored the potential agency problem in 
the firm’s FDI location decision (Ellstrand, Tihanyi, & Johnson, 2002; Strange, Filatotchev, 
Lien, & Piesse, 2009), which arises because managers and shareholders have conflicting interests 
in the selection of host countries due to the differences in their goals and risk preferences 
(Globerman, Peng, & Shapiro, 2011; Morck & Yeung, 2014; Sun & Tong, 2003; Zou & Adams, 
2008).  
I provide additional insights on the idea that firms are heterogeneous in their selection of 
host countries by going deeper into the notion that EE MNEs differ in their behavior and, 
building on agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), analyze how the governance of the firm 
affects its internationalization. Agency problems are more pronounced and have particular 
features in emerging markets. The reason is that the usual controls on managerial misbehavior 
(e.g., incentive systems, board of directors, market for corporate control, and market for 
executives,  Fama and Jensen, 1983) are not as efficient as those in advanced economies, because 
of the higher levels of information asymmetries, less sophisticated regulation and worse 
contractual enforcement that characterize emerging economies (Globerman, Peng, & Shapiro, 
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2010; Morck & Yeung, 2014; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008; Zou & Adams, 
2008).  
Specifically, I explore further the governance structure of emerging market firms and link 
two streams of literature to explain how board and ownership characteristics influence emerging 
market firms’ FDI location choice. Agency theorists argue that the representation of independent 
board members and the separation of CEO and chair positions of the board can mitigate agency 
costs through enhanced board vigilance (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983), and thereby 
encourage firms to assume a higher level of risk in international investments (Ellstrand et al., 
2002). However, the comparative corporate governance literature shows that the monitoring role 
of the board is contingent upon ownership structure of the firm (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; 
Desender, Aguilera, Crespi, & GarcÍa-cestona, 2013; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000), because 
concentrated ownership increases the block shareholders’ incentive and ability to play an active 
monitoring role, and different types of investors pursue different interests. Therefore, building on 
prior literature on corporate governance and internationalization, I investigate how the types of 
controlling shareholder (family vs. state) in the publicly listed firm moderates the impact of 
board structure on the firm’s selection of host countries.  
Agency theory is concerned with the conflict between top managers and all shareholders 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). As top managers are more risk averse than dispersed shareholders, a stronger 
board ensures the top management team takes on more risks in the firm’s strategies (Datta, 
Musteen, & Herrmann, 2009; Deutsch, 2005). In addition to top managers and dispersed 
shareholders, there are two additional corporate governance actors in the emerging economy 
context: family and state controlling shareholders. When I conceptualize the degree of risk-
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aversion on a continuous scale, the family owner is the most risk-averse, followed by top 
managers, minority shareholders and the state.  
Therefore, a stronger board, characterized by a higher representation of independent 
directors and the separation of CEO and chair positions, does not necessarily lead to more risk-
taking in the context of foreign investments. I conduct an analysis of the risk preferences of all 
corporate governance actors and the monitoring role of the board. Based on the results, I argue 
that publicly listed firms with significant family ownership characterized by CEO duality (i.e., 
the same person holding the CEO and chair positions) or a higher proportion of independent 
directors are more likely to invest in countries with favorable institutional environment, while 
state-controlled firms with such characteristics are less likely to do so.  
I test these ideas on a comprehensive sample of foreign market entries by publicly listed 
Chinese firms in 2004-2013, and find strong empirical support for the hypotheses.  
The second chapter contributes to two strands of literature. First, I add to the literature on 
the governance structure of the firm and its internationalization strategies (Bhaumik, Driffield, & 
Pal, 2009; Datta et al., 2009; Filatotchev, Strange, Piesse, & Lien, 2007), by being one of the 
first to analyze how the ownership of the firm interacts with internal governance mechanisms to 
determine FDI location choice. As I mentioned before, some studies have discussed how internal 
governance affects FDI location choice, while others have analyzed differences between family 
and state-owned firms. Both of these approaches have important drawbacks. The former 
approach does not consider the fact that he monitoring role of the board is affected by the 
ownership structure of the firm, whereas the latter approach ignores the possibility that the 
controlling shareholder exert their goals and preferences for the firm via the board and the top 
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management team. Therefore, it is necessary to explain how the interaction of board structure 
and ownership structure affects firms’ FDI locations.  
Second, I contribute to agency theory by integrating two approaches: the first highlights 
the problems that arise from conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders and the 
various mechanisms designed to mitigate these conflicts (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976), while the second focuses on the differences in objectives and agency problems 
among firms with different dominant shareholders (Cuervo-Cazurra, Inkpen, Musacchio, & 
Ramaswamy, 2014; Young et al., 2008). I explain how these two agency relationships interact 
with each other in the context of emerging market firms. The underdeveloped institutional 
environment and the unique ownership structure of emerging economy MNEs require a 
modification of some of the traditional agency arguments, because emerging economics are 
characterized by higher levels of information asymmetries, less sophisticated regulation and 
worse contractual enforcement. My findings provide a better understanding of how some of the 
unique characteristics of emerging economy MNEs that arise from the influence of their country 
of origin, affect the MNE’s internationalization (Lu, Liu, Wright, & Filatotchev, 2014; Luo & 
Tung, 2007; Meyer et al., 2014; Morck, Yeung, & Zhao, 2008).  
2.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.2.1 Agency Theory and Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets 
I build on agency theory to explain how corporate governance affects FDI location choice 
by emerging economy MNEs. Agency theory focuses on understanding the relationships 
between two parties that enter an agency relationship in which the principal delegates to the 
agent the ability to make decisions on his/her behalf (Ross, 1973). Due to imperfect and 
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asymmetric information, and a divergence of objectives between the principal and the agent, the 
principal has to establish monitoring and controlling mechanisms to ensure that his/her 
objectives are achieved. The agency theory is traditionally viewed as explaining the relationship 
between shareholders and managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), but it can be applied to any 
relationship between two parties in which one asks the second to do something on their behalf, 
such as employment relationships, strategic alliances or supplier and distribution networks.  
In the realm of corporate governance, the traditional view of agency theory is concerned 
with the agency problems that arise from the separation of ownership and control in the 
shareholders-as-principals and managers-as-agents relationship (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). In addition to differences in objectives, shareholders and managers typically 
have different attitudes toward risk, with managers being more risk-averse than shareholders 
because more of their future wealth and human capital is at stake if the decisions are not 
successful (Eisenhardt, 1989). Moreover, the agency problems are exacerbated further because 
managers have more firm-specific knowledge and the ability to gather tacit information about the 
firm and their own actions that shareholders do not have, which leads to greater information 
asymmetry between managers and shareholders.  
Although agency theory has universal appeal, some of its assumptions need to be 
modified when analyzing corporate governance in emerging markets. First, most emerging 
economies are characterized by underdeveloped institutional environment (Dharwadkar, George, 
& Brandes, 2000; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2002; Khanna & Palepu, 
2010) that heighten agency problems. Agency theory was developed by analyzing the behavior 
of firms in advanced economies, such as the United States, which are characterized by: i) a 
relatively well-established institutional system where shareholders and managers can establish 
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contractual agreements that can be easily enforced in courts, ii) well-established and 
sophisticated regulations and regulatory agencies that can compel managers to disclose 
appropriate information to shareholders, and iii) properly enforced laws and regulations that 
protect shareholders from managerial misbehavior. In contrast, emerging economies tend to have 
worse institutions that result in greater agency problems for several reasons. There is greater 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders due to the existence of less 
developed accounting and disclosure standards and weaker regulatory agencies. The level of 
sophistication for laws and regulations that aim to prevent managerial misbehavior, shareholder 
misbehavior and the expropriation of minority shareholders (the so-called principal-principal 
problem (Young et al., 2008)) is relatively low. It is more difficult to enforce contracts, rules and 
regulations, due to more inefficient judicial systems and, in some countries, a lack of 
independence of judges from government interference and an openness of judges to accept bribes 
(Djankov et al., 2002). These weaker institutions are reflected in the particularities of corporate 
governance practices of emerging economies (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Globerman et 
al., 2010).  
Second, most emerging economies are characterized by high ownership concentration 
(Claessens et al., 2000; Young et al., 2008), which creates unique agency problems. Agency 
theory was developed based on the assumption of dispersed ownership (Berle & Means, 1932), 
the norm in large publicly traded companies in the United States. Small shareholders are not 
incentivized to monitor top managers because such shareholders are likely to have ownership 
positions in many firms, which makes monitoring particularly costly. Moreover, small 
shareholders do not have sufficient power to influence managerial decisions or votes at 
shareholder meetings (such as voting on the board of directors). However, when ownership is 
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concentrated, as is the case in most firms from emerging economies, the controlling shareholder 
has both the incentive and the capability to monitor top managers, and to exert substantial 
influence over the firm’s strategic decisions (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). A controlling 
shareholder has a significant portion of her financial wealth concentrated in a single firm, which 
makes monitoring less costly. Due to the controlling shareholder’s concentrated position in the 
firm, she will also be able to reap most of the rewards from an increase in the stock price, and 
exert sufficient influence at shareholder meetings to block unwanted managerial decisions or 
appoint directors of the board. As a result, there are two types of principal-agent problems in 
emerging economies: conflicts of interests between shareholders and managers, and between the 
controlling shareholder and minority shareholders (Kato & Long, 2006a).  
Thus, I analyze corporate governance issues in emerging markets and extend agency 
theory by challenging some of its implicit assumptions. Although in the empirical analysis I 
study the behavior of Chinese firms (a more detailed description of the specific characteristics of 
Chinese corporate governance practices appears in the research design), the arguments are likely 
to hold for other emerging markets as well. 
2.2.2 Conceptual Model 
In this chapter, I examine the impact of corporate governance structure on the FDI 
location strategy of publicly listed firms in China. FDI exposes the MNE to great risks as it often 
involves massive fixed investments that are irrevocable in the foreign market (Globerman & 
Shapiro, 2003). Entering countries with poor institutional quality might inflate the risk of foreign 
investment (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Fan, Morck, Xu, & Yeung, 2009). However, the 
benefit of investing in countries with poor institutional quality is that the MNE might be able to 
enjoy monopoly rents in less developed and less competitive markets in the long term (Garcia-
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Canal & Guillen, 2008). In contrast, investing in more developed economies endows the MNE 
with a safe environment, but it also means lower expected returns on investment, as the MNE is 
competing with other well-established and potentially more competent MNEs in a saturated 
market. Rugman and Nguyen (2014) show that emerging economy firms do not become more 
profitable by investing in developed economies. Given the high outcome uncertainty of FDI 
location choice, agency problems exist in the decision making process (Eisenhardt, 1989). I 
conjecture that the board of directors and ownership structure, as internal control mechanisms to 
alleviate agency problems, play an important role in making the location decision of firms’ 
outward investment (Ellstrand et al., 2002).  
Considering that state and family owners have different goals and risk attitudes (Chen et 
al., 2009), the governance mechanisms designed based on the general assumption that managers 
are more risk-averse than shareholders should have a differential impact depending on the type 
of firm. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the role of the board of directors on a firm’s FDI 
location choice separately for state- and family controlled firms. I argue that in family controlled 
firms, CEO duality and a higher proportion of independent directors strengthens the positive 
impact of host country institutional quality on foreign market entry; whereas in state controlled 
firms, these two board characteristics weakens the relationship. The hypothesized relationships 
depicted in the conceptual model (Figure 2-1) are explained in details in the next section. 
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Figure 2- 1: The Relationship between Institutional Quality, Governance Structure, and Foreign 
Market Entry 
 
2.3 HYPOTHESES 
2.3.1 Institutional Quality and Foreign Market Entry    
Institutional quality is the extent to which pro-market institutions are well established in 
the society (Djankov et al., 2002; Fan, Morck, Xu, & Yeung, 2009; Khanna and Palepu, 2010), 
which include public agencies and policies that define and maintain economic, legal and social 
relations in the society (North, 1990). In the IB literature, scholars have proposed multiple 
mechanisms that connect the institutional quality of the host country with the probability of 
foreign market entry by MNEs (see Table 2-1). 
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Table 2- 1: Institutional Quality and the Probability of Foreign Market Entry 
Context 
Institutional 
quality 
Mechanisms Details 
Empirical/theoretical 
support 
MNEs from 
developed 
economies 
Positive impact 
on the 
probability of 
entry 
Risk 
e.g., Better legal 
protection of assets 
reduces the chance 
of expropriation; 
Better intellectual 
property protection 
reduces  the chance 
of knowledge 
leakage 
 
Coeurderoy and 
Murray (2008); 
Delios and Henisz, 
(2003); 
Globerman and 
Shapiro (2002); 
Henisz (2000); 
Slangen and 
Beugelsdijk (2010) 
MNEs from 
emerging 
economies 
Negative 
impact on the 
probability of 
entry 
Risk 
preference 
Firms are less 
sensitive towards 
risk. 
Buckley et al. (2007); 
Duanmu (2014) 
Capability 
Institutional 
advantage/political 
capabilities of 
MNEs from 
emerging economies 
Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Genc (2008); 
Holburn and Zelner 
(2010); 
Martin (2014) 
Institutional 
barriers 
Ideological 
conflicts, perceived 
threats to national 
security 
Cui and Jiang (2012); 
Meyer et al. (2014) 
 
Positive impact 
on the 
probability of 
entry 
Motive 
Strategic asset 
seeking motives of 
MNEs from 
emerging 
economies; 
Escape from 
institutional 
constraints from 
home countries. 
Li, Li, and Shapiro 
(2012); 
Luo and Tung (2007); 
Yamakawa, Peng, and 
Deeds (2008) 
 
All else equal, multinationals are more likely to invest in countries with better 
institutional quality (Coeurderoy & Murray, 2008; Delios & Henisz, 2003; Globerman & 
Shapiro, 2002; Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010). The arguments are that well established 
institutions protect property rights and employee safety, facilitate business transactions and 
information flow in the market, and thus minimize the cost and risk of doing business for both 
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local and foreign firms (Duanmu, 2014; Khanna & Palepu, 2010; North, 1990). The implicit 
assumption of studies on advanced economy firms is that they are transferring their proprietary 
technologies and capabilities to other countries, and such firms prefer countries that not only 
offer great market opportunities, but which also enables firms to protect their intellectual 
property rights from imitation by local competitors and expropriation by alliance partners (Zhao, 
2006). This does not imply that firms will completely forego countries with poor institutions, 
although some do, but that firms will be less likely to invest in such countries in comparison to 
countries with better institutions.  
The main mechanism through which institutional quality has a positive impact on the 
probability of foreign market entry for advanced economy firms is through risk reduction. 
However, existing studies on emerging economy firms have documented both positive and 
negative associations between institutional quality and the probability of foreign market entry. 
Several explanations have been proposed in the literature. First, some scholars argue that 
emerging economy firms, particularly state-owned firms, are less sensitive towards risk, which 
makes them more likely to enter countries with poor institutional quality (Buckley et al., 2007; 
Duanmu, 2014). Second, other scholars argue that institutional quality of the host country has a 
negative impact on the probability of foreign market entry for emerging economy firms, because 
they have experience with poor institutions at home, and they have developed the political 
capabilities to deal with corruption and policy uncertainty in less favorable institutional 
environment (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Holburn & Zelner, 2010; Martin, 2014). Third, the 
negative association between institutional quality and the probability of foreign market entry has 
also been explained by the institutional barriers incurred due to perceived threats to national 
security and ideological conflicts between host and home countries (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Meyer et 
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al., 2014).  Fourth, some scholars argue that institutional quality should have a positive effect on 
the probability of foreign market entry for emerging economy firms, because emerging economy 
firms are incentivized to acquire foreign strategic assets and to escape from domestic 
institutional constraints (Deng, 2009; Luo & Tung, 2007; Yamakawa, Peng, & Deeds, 2007). 
Many of the more sophisticated technological assets are created in countries with strong 
institutions that provide better incentives for firms to innovate via protected patents and an 
effective judicial system (Furman, Porter, & Stern, 2002). Like other investors, emerging 
economy firms are likely to be attracted to countries with high institutional quality so that their 
business activities are less constrained by underdeveloped institutional environment in the home 
country. Consistent with this view, Li, Li, and Shapiro (2012) find that Chinese firms have a 
higher propensity to invest in countries with a better institutional environment.  
In sum, the direct relationship between institutional quality and the probability of foreign 
market entry is unclear for emerging economy MNEs. The existing literature offers several 
explanations based on firms’ risk preferences, political capabilities, strategic motives, and the 
institutional barriers between host and home countries. However, I argue that the underlying 
assumption for these studies on emerging economy MNEs is actually consistent with the studies 
on advanced economy MNEs, which is that underdeveloped institutional environment should 
increase hazards for doing business and thereby reduce the probability of foreign market entry 
(Henisz, 2000; Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010). However, firm’s risk preferences, political 
capabilities and strategic motives can moderate the relationship between institutional quality and 
probability of foreign market entry by changing the magnitude or direction of the relationship. 
One important reason why previous studies on emerging economy MNEs are not in agreement 
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about the sign of the relationship between institutional quality and the probability of market entry 
is that these studies have significant differences in terms of sample selection.  
I therefore propose that, controlling for other factors, institutional quality should be 
positively associated with the probability of foreign market entry even for emerging economy 
MNEs. This does not exclude the possibility that emerging economy MNEs may be more likely 
to invest in countries with poor institutions relative to advanced economy MNEs. However, I do 
not analyze the relative difference in this chapter since my sole focus is emerging economy 
MNEs.  
Hypothesis 1: Institutional quality of the host country increases the probability of foreign market 
entry by emerging economy firms. 
2.3.2 Board Structure and FDI Location Choice 
The existing literature suggests that the proportion of independent directors and the 
separation of CEO and chair positions may influence the firm’s propensity to take risks in its 
international expansion (Datta et al., 2009; Ellstrand et al., 2002), leading to a higher probability 
of entering risky countries.  
Agency theory was originally developed in the advanced economy, particularly Anglo-
Saxon, context. The assumption is that the manager (the agent) is opportunistic (Eisenhardt, 
1989). That is, without proper monitoring or incentives, the manager is more likely to pursue 
strategies that maximize her personal benefits rather than the interests of all shareholders (the 
principal). Because the manager is more risk-averse than shareholders, they prefer more 
conservative strategies. However, this type of strategy is viewed as an opportunity cost for 
shareholders (Deutsch, 2005). Thus, according to agency theory, the role of the board is to 
monitor top managers in order to ensure that managers cater to the interests of all shareholders. 
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In terms of risk-taking, the board should attempt to impose the risk preferences of the 
shareholders on the firm’s strategic decisions.  
Board independence refers to the extent to which the board is composed of outside 
directors (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). Inside directors are employees of the 
organization, and their compensation and career depend on firm performance. Inside directors 
are therefore expected to be more sympathetic to the risk preferences of the CEO relative to the 
firm’s shareholders (Oviatt, 1988). Outside directors (or independent board directors) are board 
members who are currently not employed by the focal shareholding company or affiliated 
companies. Because they have no operational relationship with the company, they can 
objectively evaluate and monitor managerial decisions in order to protect the interests of 
shareholders (Deutsch, 2005). The literature shows that boards characterized by a higher 
proportion of independent board members are more likely to engage in risky strategies such as 
R&D investment or new product innovation (Chen & Hsu, 2009; Deutsch, 2005). In the context 
of internationalization, Ellstrand et al. (2002) find that firms with a higher proportion of 
independent directors are associated with high levels of political risk in their portfolio of foreign 
investment; while Datta et al. (2009) find that firms with a higher representation of independent 
directors are more likely to endorse acquisition over joint ventures in foreign market entry.  
In sum, in the Anglo-Saxon context, a higher representation of independent directors 
enhances the monitoring role of the board, which should prevent managers from pursuing 
strategies that might hurt the interests of all shareholders. In this case, a more independent board 
encourages the firm to be less risk-averse (since dispersed owners are less risk-averse than top 
managers), which increases the likelihood that the firm invests in countries with lower 
institutional quality that are more risky, but which also yield higher potential long-term reward.  
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CEO duality refers to the practice that one person serves as both the CEO and the 
chairman of the board (Dalton et al., 1998). According to agency theory, CEO duality 
compromises the board’s ability to monitor the CEO and leads to a more biased assessment of 
management decisions (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994). The CEO is more risk-averse than the 
shareholders, and when the CEO also assumes the chair position, she can use her power to 
persuade the board to take conservative strategies that lead to stable firm performance rather than 
risky investments with a higher potential for long-term returns. For instance, CEO duality has 
been found to be negatively related to R&D investments and internal new product development 
(Deutsch, 2005). In the IB literature, Ellstrand et al. (2002) find that firms with CEO duality are 
associated with lower levels of political risk in their portfolio of foreign investment. Datta et al. 
(2009) find that firms with CEO duality are more likely to favor joint ventures over risky 
acquisitions in foreign market entry. 
In sum, in the Anglo-Saxon context, CEO duality compromises the monitoring role of the 
board, which provides top managers more space to pursue strategies that best suit their personal 
interests. In this case, firms with CEO duality are more risk-averse, which will increase the 
probability that the firm enters countries with high institutional quality. 
However, in the context of emerging economies, I argue that the ownership structure of 
the firm (state versus family) changes the risk preferences of the top managers and shareholders 
and modifies the monitoring role of the board, which results in diverging effects of board 
structure on the firm’s selection of host countries. Thus, I do not provide or test formal 
hypotheses regarding the moderating effect of board structure on the probability of foreign 
market entry. However, the monitoring mechanism provides the basic argument for studying the 
interaction effect between board structure and firm ownership on the firm’s selection of host 
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countries in terms of institutional quality. Table 2-2 shows the mechanisms that board structures 
affect the firm’s FDI location choice for family and state controlled firms in the emerging 
economy context, as well as firms in the Anglo-Saxon context.  
Table 2- 2: Board Structure, Firm Ownership and the Firm’s Preference for Foreign 
Market Entry 
Context Assumption Measure Mechanisms 
Risk 
preference 
Institutio
-nal 
quality 
Anglo-
Saxon 
Top managers 
are more risk-
averse than all 
shareholders 
Representation 
of independent 
directors 
Enhance board monitoring 
Less risk-
averse 
Lower 
CEO duality Weaken board monitoring 
More risk-
averse 
Higher 
China and 
other 
emerging 
economies 
Family 
controlling 
owner is more 
risk-averse than 
top managers 
and minority 
shareholder 
Representation 
of independent 
directors 
Enhance board 
monitoring; better 
alignment of interests with 
the risk-averse controlling 
owner 
More risk-
averse 
Higher 
CEO duality 
Make top managers more 
risk-averse than all 
shareholders; 
reduce board monitoring 
More risk-
averse 
Higher 
State 
controlling 
owner is less 
risk-averse than 
top managers 
and minority 
shareholder 
Representation 
of independent 
directors 
Enhance board 
monitoring; better 
alignment of interests with 
the risk-neutral controlling 
owner 
Less risk-
averse 
Lower 
CEO duality 
Make top managers less-
risk averse than all 
shareholders; 
reduce board monitoring 
Less risk-
averse 
Lower 
2.3.3 Board Structure, Firm Ownership and FDI Location Choice 
The main contribution of my study is to explain how the relationship between 
institutional quality and foreign market entry is modified by the internal governance of the firm, 
in particular by the interaction between the firm’s ownership structure and board structure.  
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It is necessary to re-examine the moderating effect of board independence by taking into 
account the firm’s ownership structure in the Chinese context. The reason is that independent 
directors represent the interests of all shareholders, but there is significant heterogeneity in terms 
of the risk preference among the various shareholders of the firm (dispersed minority 
shareholders versus the controlling shareholder, such as a family or the state).  
Family owners are highly risk-averse as they cannot diversify their assets or employment 
opportunities (Strange et al., 2009). Research has shown that founder-owner firms are less likely 
to pursue high-risk strategies (Chen & Hsu, 2009; Fama & Jensen, 1983). The tendency of 
family-owners to be risk-averse is also supported by recent research on the internationalization 
of family-owned firms (e.g., Arregle, Naldi, Nordqvist, & Hitt, 2012; Bhaumik et al., 2009; 
Filatotchev et al., 2007). This stream of literature shows that family ownership is associated with 
a lower degree of internationalization, lower equity ownership in foreign subsidiaries and a lower 
probability of entering countries with low institutional quality.   
The state as the controlling shareholder is typically assumed to be risk-neutral (Zou & 
Adams, 2008). There are several reasons for this argument. First, the de facto owners of state 
assets are the country’s citizens (Kato & Long, 2006b), but the citizens (as collective owners) do 
not have any meaningful control over how state assets are managed and invested. Various 
government agencies represent the public to oversee state assets, but they do not bear any 
residual risks over the control and use of state assets (Lin, 2001), because the government 
officials’ salary and career prospects tend to be linked to their administrative ranking rather than 
the performance of the assets being managed (Clarke, 2003; Zou & Adams, 2008). Second, the 
state (and state-owned holding companies) can diversify their investment and reduce portfolio 
risk by holding ownership positions in many firms (Sun & Tong, 2003). Third, the state might 
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prioritize political or social goals (e.g., national interests, social welfare and employment 
protection) over economic goals, in which case risk becomes a lesser concern in some strategic 
choices, such as acquiring critical natural resources for the home country economic development 
(Luo & Tung, 2007). The existing literature provides considerable empirical support for the idea 
that state-owned firms are virtually risk-neutral in their foreign investments (Buckley, Clegg, 
Cross, Liu, Voss, & Zheng, 2007; Duanmu, 2014; Ramaswamy, Li, & Veliyath, 2002).  
Minority shareholders in China are similar to dispersed shareholders in the advanced 
economy context in terms of risk-aversion. They can both reduce portfolio risk through 
diversification. Consequently, minority shareholders are much less risk-averse compared to the 
family as a controlling shareholder (Eisenhardt, 1989; Strange et al., 2009). However, compared 
with the risk-neutral state, minority shareholders remain more risk-averse.  
Top managers in both advanced and emerging economy firms are primarily concerned 
with their job security, compensation and reputation (Eisenhardt, 1988). As they cannot diversify 
their employment or human capital, they are more risk-averse than minority shareholders, but 
much less risk-averse than the family controlling owner, whose financial wealth is concentrated 
within one firm.  
In the Anglo-Saxon context, the prediction for the firm’s overall risk preference in FDI 
location choice is inferred from the risk preferences of the top managers’ and minority 
shareholders’ based on the relative power of the two players. This relative power is determined 
by the firm’s board structure. However, in the Chinese context, there are four relevant corporate 
governance actors: the family as a controlling owner, the state as a controlling owner, minority 
shareholders, and top managers; and the board structure determines whose risk preferences are 
more likely to be reflected in the firm’s strategic decisions. Based on the discussion so far, when 
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the degree of risk-aversion (RA) is measured on a continuous scale from 0 to 10, I rank the 
family controlling shareholder as the most risk-averse (RA = 10), followed by the top manager 
(RA = 2), minority shareholder (RA = 1) and the state controlling shareholder (RA = 0). In the 
following two sections I will provide additional examples to illustrate how the board structure 
(independent directors and CEO duality) affect the firm’s risk preferences, which determines the 
moderating relationship between institutional quality and the FDI location choice.  
2.3.3.1 Independent directors, firm ownership and FDI location choice 
In the Anglo-Saxon context, the existing literature has documented that a higher 
representation of independent directors enhances the monitoring role of the board, and thereby 
prevents the top managers from taking more conservative strategies. In the Chinese context, a 
higher ratio of independent directors also increases the monitoring role of the board. The existing 
literature finds that the presence of independent directors does improve the quality of corporate 
governance in China (Kato & Long, 2006a). For instance, board independence has been found to 
be associated with a greater pay-for-performance sensitivity, reduced incidence of fraud and 
insider self-dealing, and higher investment efficiency and firm performance in China (e.g., Chen, 
Firth, Gao, & Rui, 2006; Conyon & He, 2011; Liu, Miletkov, Wei, & Yang, 2015).  
The personal risk preferences of independent directors are less relevant, as they are 
supposed to represent the interests (including risk preferences) of all shareholders. In the Anglo-
Saxon context, firm ownership is dispersed among many small shareholders who are less risk-
averse than the top managers, in which case a higher ratio of independent directors is associated 
with a better alignment of interests (and risk-preferences) with the less risk-averse shareholders, 
which results in the firm engaging in in more risk-taking strategies. However, in the Chinese 
context, I need to take into account the fact that ownership is typically concentrated with one 
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controlling owner (state or family), whereas minority shareholders hold only small stakes in the 
firm. Since independent directors represent the interest of all shareholders (in proportion to their 
ownership) and because the controlling shareholder (family or state) can either be more or less 
risk-averse than the top managers, it is no longer obvious whether a higher ratio of independent 
directors leads to more or less risk taking by the firm.   
For family controlled firms, independent directors represent the interests of both the 
family-owner and the minority shareholders. In this case, the risk-aversion of independent 
directors (as representatives of the firm’s shareholders) should be based on a weighted average of 
the risk-aversion of all shareholders in proportion to their ownership, i.e., family ownership * the 
family owner’s risk-aversion + minority shareholders’ ownership * their risk-aversion. To 
illustrate, using the degrees of risk-aversion (RA) discussed in the previous section and assuming 
that the family controls the firm via an ownership of 50.1 %, the degree of risk-aversion for 
independent directors is: 50.1%*10 + 49.9%*1 = 5.5. Therefore, a higher representation of 
independent directors on board enhances board monitoring (enabling the board to impose the risk 
preferences of the firm’s investors), which increases the firm’s risk aversion (from RA = 2 for 
top managers to RA = 5.5 for the firm’s shareholders), which in turn encourages the firm to take 
less risks in foreign market entry.  
For this argument to go through, it is necessary for the family controlling owner to be 
substantially more risk-averse than the top managers. As I already discussed in the previous 
section, family owners are likely to be highly risk-averse because of the extreme concentration of 
their financial wealth (and possibly also their human capital) within one firm. Many scholars 
have also noted that independent directors in China do not always represent the interests of all 
shareholders, because they are often nominated by controlling shareholders to protect the 
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interests of large rather than small shareholders in the firm (Clarke, 2006; Lin, 2001; Morck & 
Yeung, 2014). This argument would, in the context of the previous numerical example, imply 
that independent directors may put more weight on the controlling family-owner (RA = 10), and 
less weight on the minority shareholder (RA = 1). This would only serve to increase the risk-
aversion of the independent directors further, resulting in an even higher probability for the firm 
to enter countries with good institutional quality. 
Hypothesis 2: In family-owned firms from emerging markets, the proportion of 
independent board members strengthens the positive relationship between host country 
institutional quality and the probability of foreign market entry.  
In contrast, for state-controlled firms, independent directors represent the interests of the 
state and the minority shareholders. Since the state is risk-neutral (RA = 0) and the minority 
shareholders have a relatively low degree of risk-aversion (RA = 1) compared to top managers 
(RA = 2), it becomes clear that the risk-aversion of the independent directors will be somewhere 
between 0 and 1, depending on the relative ownership positions of the state and the minority 
shareholders. In this case, independent directors are less risk-averse than the top managers, 
which implies that a higher proportion of independent directors on board enhances board 
monitoring and encourages risk taking. Thus,  
Hypothesis 3: In state-owned firms from emerging markets, the proportion of 
independent board members weakens the positive relationship between host country institutional 
quality and probability of foreign market entry. 
2.3.3.2 CEO duality, firm ownership and FDI location choice  
In the Anglo-Saxon context, CEO duality affects the firm’s selection of host countries by 
reducing the monitoring role of the board. Because top managers are more risk-averse than 
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dispersed shareholders, firms featured by CEO duality are more likely to enter countries with 
better institutional quality. However, in the Chinese context, I argue that CEO duality affects the 
firm’s risk preference by changing the top management team’s risk preference and 
compromising the monitoring role of the board.  
In family-controlled firms, CEO duality often occurs when the founder of the firm 
assumes both the CEO and chair positions (Bhaumik et al., 2009; Peng, Li, Xie, & Su, 2009). 
Compared with CEOs who are most concerned with employment security and reputation, CEOs 
with dual roles have not only substantial human capital invested in the firm, but also highly 
concentrated financial wealth in the firm. Therefore, CEOs with dual roles (“family-owner-
CEOs”) are considerably more risk-averse (RA = 10) than CEOs without such dual roles (RA = 
2). CEO duality will also compromise the monitoring ability of independent directors (who 
represent the interests of both the controlling owner, and minority shareholders) because family-
owner-CEOs can influence other top managers through their constant interactions. Therefore, in 
family-controlled firms featured by CEO duality, top managers become extremely risk averse, 
which increases the likelihood that the firm enters countries with high institutional quality.  
Hypothesis 4: In family-owned firms from emerging markets, CEO duality strengthens 
the positive relationship between host country institutional quality and the probability of foreign 
market entry. 
In state-controlled firms, CEO duality plays a different role because the state has multiple 
goals (Sun & Tong, 2003). On the one hand, the state wants the firm to run efficiently to increase 
the return on investment and contribute to the national budget. On the other hand, the state needs 
to fulfill political and social goals, such as maintaining employment levels, social stability, and 
national interest. Unfortunately, these goals are not always compatible (Clarke, 2006). For 
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instance, keeping redundant employees hurts firm performance, but it contributes to societal 
stability. These incongruent goals of the controlling shareholder create problems for both the 
boards and the CEO, because the CEO may misconstrue the priority of different goals and the 
board directors have no clear criteria to evaluate and monitor the CEO (Clarke, 2003). This 
problem is alleviated in state-owned firms characterized by CEO duality. In standard agency 
theory, CEO duality exacerbates the agency issue because the agent has more power to pursue 
her own interests at the expense of all shareholders. In contrast, I argue that in state-owned firms, 
the CEO is bewildered by the multiple goals of the controlling shareholder. CEO duality resolves 
this problem by better aligning the interests of the CEO with that of the controlling shareholder.  
CEO duality in state owned firms aligns the interests of the manager with the political 
interest of the largest owner, the state. In SOEs it is important to consider the political aspirations 
of CEOs in analyzing their goals and risk preferences (Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007). In firms that 
the state holds substantial ownership, the government appoints the CEO or the chair of the board 
from among civil servants (Lin, 2001; Morck & Yeung, 2014) and these appointees consider 
their career within the state apparatus. The CEO or chair of the board of a successful firm might 
be promoted to administrative positions such as the head of an important agency in a province or 
state or the mayor of a large city; while successful civil servants heading an agency in a province 
or state or the mayor of a dynamic small city might be promoted to important managerial 
positions in SOEs such as chairman or manager (Morck & Yeung, 2014). When CEO duality 
occurs, the CEO often has a visible political career, and the political/social goal is amplified. The 
political clout of CEO duality in state-owned firms can also be seen from the fact that many of 
these CEOs assume roles in external organizations, including non-governmental ones, to achieve 
corporate agendas (e.g., Dal Bo, 2006; Lee, Humphreys, & Pugh, 1997).  
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Even though agency theory predicts that top managers are generally risk-averse, such a 
tendency is decreased by CEO duality among state-owned firms. Investing in countries with 
weak institutions that have close diplomatic ties with the home country may be seen as a way to 
support the government’s political objectives, which contributes to the political career of the 
CEO of an SOE (Morck et al., 2008). In this case, firm performance is of second-order 
importance for the manager. In addition, the stronger political role of the CEO also increases her 
propensity to enter countries with higher risk and lower institutional quality as her personal risk 
attitude might resemble that of civil servants in charge of supervising state assets. In sum, the 
CEO with dual role as chairman of the board is less risk-averse (closer to the risk-neutral state) 
because she is very powerful and influential in the society, in which case the performance of the 
firm cannot jeopardize her career (Morck & Yeung, 2014). In addition, CEO duality reduces the 
monitoring role of the minority shareholders. Since the relatively less risk-averse minority 
shareholder cannot exert their influence over the board when CEO duality exists, the risk-
preferences of the firm will more closely resemble that of the risk-neutral state. Thus,  
Hypothesis 5: In state-owned firms from emerging markets, CEO duality weakens the 
positive relationship between host country institutional quality and the probability of foreign 
market entry.  
2.4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
I test my theoretical model with foreign market entries by publicly listed firms in China 
for two reasons. First, my hypotheses concern the role of corporate governance in emerging 
economies. Previous research has studied the impact of governance structure on organizational 
strategies in developed economies (Datta et al., 2009; Ellstrand et al., 2002), but there is a lack of 
understanding of how the governance structure affects internationalization in emerging 
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economies. The corporate governance system in China started in the early 1990s, and the 
institutional environment surrounding the corporate governance system remains underdeveloped, 
which is similar to the governance system in many other emerging economies (Claessens et al., 
2000; Globerman et al., 2010; Young et al., 2008). Second, most overseas investments by 
Chinese firms, especially by privately owned Chinese firms, started after 2004. This context 
therefore provides a great opportunity to study the role of governance structure on firms’ FDI 
location choice, as the outcome of foreign investment is more uncertain for less experienced 
MNEs.  
2.4.1 Corporate Governance in China  
In the early 1990s, as part of the economic reform in China, many large and medium-
sized state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were transformed into publicly listed firms on the two 
national stock exchanges, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. To 
maintain the ideology of the socialist market economy, the Chinese government retains a 
substantial ownership of most privatized enterprises (Sun & Tong, 2003). Since 2004, an 
increasing number of private firms, especially family firms, have been listed on the market (Cai, 
Luo, & Wan, 2012). 
China’s public listed firms have five different types of shares: state shares, legal person 
shares, employee shares, A- and B-shares (Jiang & Kim, 2015). State shares in China are held by 
the central government, local government, or solely government-owned enterprises. Legal person 
shares are owned by state controlled legal persons, or privately controlled legal persons. 
Employee shares are issued to workers and managers of a listed company, but the quantity is 
limited. A-shares are ordinary equity shares that are exclusively available to Chinese citizens and 
domestic institutions. B-shares are issued to foreigners and people from Hong Kong, Macao and 
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Taiwan. State shares and legal person shares are substantial and non-tradable in China’s listed 
firms until the split-share structure reform in 2005 that requires all shares tradable starting from 
2005 (Liao, Liu, & Wang, 2014). 
The ownership of China’s publicly listed firms is highly concentrated. In most firms, there 
is a single dominant shareholder that has considerable power and influence over the way the firm 
is run (Chen, Firth, & Xu, 2009). The controlling shareholder has a significant influence over the 
appointment of the CEO and the board members (Conyon & He, 2011; Sun & Tong, 2003). 
Based on the identity of the controlling shareholder, in this chapter, I classify a firm as state-
owned if it is controlled by the state (including government agencies and state owned enterprises 
affiliated to the central or local governments). I classify a firm as family-owned if its ultimate 
owner is an individual or family member who controls the voting rights in the firm  (Cheng, Lin, 
& Wei, 2014; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999).  
Chinese company law provides for a two-tiered board structure, consisting of a board of 
supervisors and a board of directors (Lin, 2001). The intention is that the board of supervisors 
performs an overseeing role, whereas the board of directors plays an active managerial role. 
However, the supervisory board has been shown to be ineffective in monitoring management 
(Fan et al., 2007). In response to shareholder pressures and the need for further market reforms, 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has attempted to revive the monitoring 
role of the board through increased representation of independent directors on the board. On 
August 16, 2001, the CSRC issued The Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the 
Board of Directors of Listed Companies, requiring that by June 30, 2002, each listed firm in 
China shall have at least two independent directors and that by June 30, 2003, at least one-third 
of the board should be comprised of independent directors.  
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2.4.2 Data Sources 
The data on foreign market entries is collected from annual reports of Chinese publicly 
listed firms between 2004 and 2013. I choose 2004 as the starting year for three reasons: First, 
the quality of information in annual reports has substantially improved starting in the year 2001 
(Wang & Qian, 2011); second, the outward FDI by Chinese firms gained pace after China’s 
access to WTO at the end of 2001 (Buckley, Clegg, et al., 2007); and third, the Chinese 
government finalized the quotas regarding board composition by June 2003.  
In order to identify foreign market entries I begin by identifying firms with foreign 
subsidiaries in 2010. For firms included in this sub-sample, I check their annual reports every 
year from 2004 to 2013 in order to find out when the subsidiary was established. I record the 
establishment year of the subsidiary as follows: if the annual report clearly specifies the year of 
establishment, then I use the reported year; if the year is not clearly specified, I use the year that 
the board approved the foreign investment; if the year of approval is not found, I assume that the 
subsidiary was established in the year that it first appeared in the annual report. Parent firm 
information is obtained from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) 
database, which has been widely used in management and corporate finance literature (e.g., 
Duanmu, 2014; Fan et al., 2007; Liao et al., 2014; Wang & Qian, 2011).  
This data collection method accurately identifies foreign subsidiaries of Chinese firms as 
long as it had at least one foreign subsidiary in 2010. Foreign subsidiaries that were terminated 
during the sample period are also identified and included in the final sample. The only exception 
is when a firm terminated all of its foreign subsidiaries prior to 2010, in which case the firm 
would not appear in my initial search in 2010. Such omissions are, however, not a major 
concern. The internationalization of Chinese publicly listed firms is a relatively recent 
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phenomenon with the total number of foreign investment increasing from 20 in 2004 to 129 in 
2013 based on my final sample. It is reasonable to assume that the likelihood that the firm closes 
all of its foreign subsidiaries so soon after starting the process is low.  
In order for a foreign market entry to be included in my raw sample, I require that the 
Chinese parent firm owns at least 20 percent of the equity in the subsidiary (Lu et al., 2014). I 
discard entries with missing firm or country-level countries. Moreover, I discard firms in the 
financial and utilities industries, because such firms have substantially different capital structures 
that make it difficult to obtain firm-level measures of performance and internationalization that 
are comparable with other firms. With these initial restrictions I have 1181 foreign market entries 
by 255 firms over the period 2004-2013.  
In order to ensure that the choice set of foreign countries is as consistent and homogeneous 
as possible, I impose several additional sample restrictions. First, I exclude foreign investments 
in tax havens, as investments in these countries are likely to be driven by tax considerations 
(Meyer et al., 2014). This restriction reduces the total number of foreign entries to 1178. The 
reduction in foreign market entries is small because many tax havens are excluded from the 
initial sample as these countries have missing country-level variables. Second, I exclude Hong 
Kong and Macao, as they are officially part of China and may belong to the “domestic” choice 
set, rather than foreign one. This restriction reduces the sample to 844 foreign market entries. 
Finally, I exclude countries with less than two entries unless such countries can be combined 
together with another country (or countries) to obtain a group with more than three foreign 
market entries in total. The rationale is that countries with few foreign entries may not belong to 
the choice set of alternative locations (Duanmu, 2012). The grouping is based primarily on 
institutional and geographic similarity followed by cultural similarity (Ronen & Shenkar, 2013). 
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For example, New Zealand with two foreign entries is grouped together with Australia with 47 
entries. The final sample consists of 831 foreign market entries in 47 different locations by 255 
firms.  
2.4.3 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in the second chapter is 𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖,𝑗, which is a dummy variable that 
takes the value one when firm i enters country j during the 2004-2013 period, and zero 
otherwise. I specify the choice model in greater detail below. 
2.4.4 Independent Variables 
The key independent variables of interest are institutional quality, CEO duality, and board 
independence.  
Institutional quality refers to the extent to which the institutions are well-established in the 
society. Thus, a good proxy for institutional quality should be based on the governance quality of 
the host country. Following previous research (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Slangen & 
Beugelsdijk, 2010), I construct the index of institutional quality based on the World Governance 
Indicators (WGI) (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011). The WGI covers over two hundred 
countries and regions, and it is updated annually since 2002. WGI consists of six dimensions of 
governance quality: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control for 
corruption. The indicator for each dimension ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher number 
indicating better governance. I use the average score of the six indicators as my measure for 
institutional quality.  
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CEO duality is measured with a dummy variable. It takes the value one if the CEO and 
chair positions are held simultaneously by the same person and zero otherwise (Chen & Hsu, 
2009; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994).  
Board independence is measured by the proportion of independent directors to total board 
members (Conyon & He, 2011; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). According to the CSRC, independent 
directors cannot be related to the listed firm or its subsidiaries, the top shareholders of the firm, 
or service providers of the listed firms (Liu, Miletkov, Wei, & Yang, 2015).  
2.4.5 Control Variables  
I also include several control variables. First, at the firm level, following prior literature in 
FDI location choice, I control for firm size, firm age, financial performance, organizational slack 
and ownership concentration (e.g., Duanmu, 2012; Enright, 2009; Lu et al., 2014). Firm size is 
measured by the log of total assets. Firm age is calculated as the difference between the year of 
foreign market entry and the founding year of the firm. Firm performance is measured by return 
on assets (ROA). Organizational slack is measured by the ratio of the difference between current 
asset and current liabilities to the total asset (Peng et al., 2009). This ratio reflects the current 
resources that the firm can allocate to alternate use, such as foreign investment. Ownership 
concentration is measured as the percentage of shares held by the ultimate owner (Conyon & He, 
2011; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). The stakes that the ultimate owner has in the firm may affect 
the owner’s discretionary power over strategic decisions of the firm, the owner’s exposure to 
risk, and the firm’s access to external resources. Therefore, ownership concentration captures the 
variation in ownership by the controlling shareholder. 
Second, at the country level, following prior literature, I control for market size, market 
growth, natural resources, and high technology of the host country, as well as geographic 
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distance and cultural distance between China and the host country (e.g., Coeurderoy & Murray, 
2008; Duanmu, 2014; García-Canal & Guillén, 2008b; Holburn & Zelner, 2010). Market size is 
captured by the log of the host economy’s gross domestic product (GDP) in current U.S. dollars. 
Market growth is captured by the annual GDP growth rate. The endowment of natural resources 
for a country is proxied by the percentage of ores and metal exports to total merchandise exports 
(Duanmu, 2012). High technology of a country is proxied by the ratio of high-tech products to 
total merchandise exports by country. The data used in calculating the above mentioned variables 
comes from the World Development Indicators reported by the World Bank. Geographical 
distance is measured by the natural log of the distance in thousands of kilometers between the 
capital cities of the host country and China
 
(available from: http://www.mapcrow.info). 
Following Kogut and Nath (1988), I calculate the cultural distance between China and the host 
country as the average, across Hofstede’s four dimensions of culture (power distance, 
individualism, masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance), of the ratio of the squared difference 
between two countries’ values for a given dimension to the population variance of this 
dimension.  
All firm and country level variables are measured by the average value over the period that 
firm i has existed during the 2004-2013 sample period (since I have cross-sectional sample). In 
calculating the average values for firm-level variables, I discard any observations from the year 
of initial public offering (IPO), or the year following the IPO, to reduce the possibility of 
outliers. For instance, to become a publicly listed company in China companies must obtain the 
necessary approval from the government and meet certain performance thresholds leading up to 
the IPO year. The IPO events may therefore influence firm performance during the IPO year. In 
calculating the country-level variables for country-groups (when individual countries have fewer 
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than three foreign entries and are therefore grouped with another country), I calculate a weighted 
average across country-level variables in a group with the weights given by the number of 
investments in a given country. 
Finally, I control for industry fixed effects to account for observable differences among 
firms from different industries in the overall propensity to enter foreign markets.  
2.4.6 Determining State vs. Family Owned Sub-samples 
In order to test my hypotheses, I need two distinct categories of firms, state and family 
owned firms. I use a binary classification with sub-samples to obtain a parsimonious model that 
is easy to interpret, instead of using a continuous variable for state ownership interacted with all 
of the key variables of interest. This is especially important in my case because my main 
hypotheses involve interaction effects, which are difficult to interpret in non-linear models. 
Moreover, to avoid endogeneity concerns associated with the omitted variable bias, I need to 
account for unobserved heterogeneity among state and family firms regarding their preferences 
for country characteristics (Ramasamy et al., 2012). A sub-sample approach allows us to 
estimate separate coefficients for the two types of firms, which (as the results will show) are 
often markedly different from each other. In addition, the sub-sample approach has been widely 
used to study the differences between state owned and non-state owned firms in terms of the 
impact of internal governance on organizational behaviors and performance (Jiang & Kim, 2015; 
Liao et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2015). 
To determine whether a firm is state or family owned, I rely on the identity of the ultimate 
owner of the firm. In the CSMAR database, the ultimate owner of the firm is defined based on 
the Measures for the Administration of the Takeover of Listed Companies issued by the CSRC. 
The acquirer constitutes as the ultimate owner of the firm if (1) it holds the largest amount of 
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shares among all shareholders in the firm unless there is evidence to the contrary; (2) it can 
execute or control more voting rights than the shareholder with the largest amount of shares; (3) 
it holds and controls 30% or more of the firm’s shares and voting rights unless there is evidence 
to the contrary; (4) it controls the appointment of over 50% board members through voting 
rights; (5) other conditions that is specified by the China Securities Regulatory Commission. In 
other words, the ultimate owner is the controlling shareholder of the firm. Following previous 
literature (Meyer et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2009), I consider a firm as state owned if its 
controlling shareholder is a government agency (e.g., the Ministry of Finance and the Bureau of 
State Asset Management) or another state owned enterprise (Liao et al., 2014), and as family 
owned if its ultimate owner is an individual or family member who controls the voting rights in 
the firm  (Cheng et al., 2014; La Porta et al., 1999).  
2.4.7 Empirical Methodology 
My hypotheses concern the decision by firm i of whether or not to enter country j during 
the 2004-2013 period. This decision is a binary choice and can be represented as: 
                      𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑗 =  {
 1    if 𝑈𝑖,𝑗 > 0
 0    otherwise
                                                                                            (1) 
where 𝑈𝑖,𝑗 represents the utility (or profit in excess of total costs) of firm i from entering the 
foreign market j. I specify the latent utility function as: 
                     𝑈𝑖,𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾𝑍𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗                                                                                              (2) 
where Xi is a vector of observable characteristics for firm i, Zj is a vector of observable attributes 
for country j and εi,j represents an error term with a logistic(0,1) distribution. 
In the present analysis, each firm i appears 47 times (once for each location). 
Consequently, unobserved firm-level heterogeneity due to repeated choices by the same firm 
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may generate dependence in the foreign entry choices for a given firm i. To address unobserved 
firm heterogeneity in regards to the overall propensity to enter foreign countries, I include a 
random intercept for each firm i. Such models are typically referred to as random-effects logit 
models (e.g., Enright, 2009; Train, 2003). In order to properly evaluate the statistical significance 
and economic magnitude of interaction effects in non-linear choice models such as ours, I need 
to transform the coefficient estimates into marginal effects on the probability of foreign entry (Ai 
& Norton, 2003). The random-effects logit model is also useful in this regard because neglected 
heterogeneity may affect the marginal effects when they are estimated at specific values for the 
observed covariates (Ramalho & Ramalho, 2010), which is necessary for the interpretation of the 
interaction effects.  
I will also take into account unobserved firm-level heterogeneity for country-level 
characteristics in a simple and parsimonious ways. Specifically, I estimate the choice model for 
foreign entry on sub-samples of family and state owned firms based on the prior evidence that 
state-owned firms and family controlled firms differ in their FDI location (e.g., Kang & Jiang, 
2012; Ramasamy et al., 2012). The theoretical justification for the sub-sample split is provided 
above. 
The specific choice model that I use is: 
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                   𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑃𝑖,𝑗
1 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑗
)
= 𝑎1 + 𝑏1𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝐴𝐿 𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑗
+ 𝑏2𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝐴𝐿 𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑗 ∗ 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖
+ 𝑏3𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝐴𝐿 𝑄𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑗 ∗ 𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖
+ 𝑏4𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖 +  𝑏5𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 + 𝑏6𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑗
+ ∑ 𝑏𝑘𝐼{𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 = 𝑘}
8
𝑘=1
+ 𝜏𝑖                                                                  (3) 
where 𝑃𝑖,𝑗  is the probability that my dependent variable 𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖,𝑗 = 1  conditional on the 
independent variables and estimated coefficients. 𝜏𝑖 is the random intercept for firm i, which is 
assumed to have a normal (0, σ𝜏
2) distribution. 𝐼{𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 = 𝑘} includes a set of industry dummies 
(one for each industry).  
2.5 RESULTS 
2.5.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 2-3 shows the distribution of the sample across locations and sectors. From 2004 to 
2013, both state and family owned firms have witnessed a steady increase in foreign investment, 
except in 2009. In my full sample, 77.6 percent of the foreign market entries occurred in the 
manufacturing industry; in the subsamples, 77.0 percent for state owned firms and, 78.5 percent 
for the family owned firms. In the highly state regulated industries such as mining and 
transportation, state owned firms account for most of the foreign market entries. Not 
surprisingly, state-owned firms are more likely to enter countries with high natural resources 
(e.g. “Australia & New Zealand” and “Namibia & South Africa”) relative to family-owned firms. 
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 Table 2- 3: Sample Characteristics 
 Panel A: sample distribution across locations 
Country/group Total Family State 
Institutional 
Quality 
Natural 
resources 
United States 144 90 54 1.259 3.643 
Singapore 65 27 38 1.497 1.239 
Germany +Austria 57 22 35 1.458 2.964 
Australia +New Zealand 47 9 38 1.615 27.816 
Japan 41 21 20 1.205 2.449 
Canada 33 9 24 1.607 7.864 
Indonesia 31 13 18 -0.269 5.733 
Netherlands 26 6 20 1.670 2.459 
Brazil + Suriname 21 6 15 0.009 12.744 
Malaysia 21 9 12 0.333 1.841 
Vietnam 21 15 6 -0.532 0.772 
India 20 7 13 -0.558 8.265 
Italy 20 8 12 0.566 1.948 
Kazakhstan +Russia 19 7 12 -0.708 6.988 
Thailand 19 10 9 -0.235 1.342 
United Kingdom + Ireland 19 4 15 1.408 3.580 
France 18 6 12 1.225 2.398 
Arabic countries 16 6 10 0.486 1.099 
Namibia + South Africa 13 2 11 0.301 29.383 
Luxembourg 12 5 7 1.704 5.590 
South Korea 11 4 7 0.730 2.099 
Nigeria + Ivory Coast + Cameroon 11 5 6 -1.143 1.710 
Nordic countries 11 3 8 1.799 4.043 
Switzerland 10 6 4 1.725 3.495 
Czech +Slovakia +Slovenia 9 2 7 0.870 2.382 
Poland 9 5 4 0.706 4.565 
Spain & Portugal 9 3 6 0.909 3.130 
Belgium 8 3 5 1.313 3.206 
Ghana +Mali 7 7 0 -0.073 3.822 
Philippines 7 4 3 -0.488 4.115 
Southeast Europe 7 5 2 0.124 7.874 
Peru + Argentina + Colombia +Bolivia 6 2 4 -0.406 27.181 
Chile + Uruguay 5 1 4 1.012 36.415 
Egypt +Malta 5 1 4 -0.473 7.395 
Hungary + Croatia 5 1 4 0.793 1.677 
Cambodia 5 1 4 -0.826 2.610 
Mongolia 5 1 4 -0.157 66.428 
Pakistan + Bangladesh 5 1 4 -1.008 0.821 
Panama 5 0 5 0.084 4.219 
Turkey 5 1 4 -0.058 3.445 
Israel 4 3 1 0.569 1.339 
Kenya + Uganda + Tanzania 4 3 1 -0.544 11.930 
Kyrgyzstan + Tajikistan 4 2 2 -0.941 18.203 
Mexico 4 2 2 -0.130 3.044 
Jordan +Tunisia 3 1 2 -0.046 8.014 
Saudi Arabia 2 0 2 -0.354 0.175 
Venezuela 2 0 2 -1.195 1.658 
 831 349 482 0.358 7.768 
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Panel B: Sample Distribution Across Industry Sectors 
IND Industry  TOTAL STATE FAMILY 
A Agriculture, forestry, livestock farming, fishery 5 5 0 
B Mining  39 6 33 
C Manufacturing  645 273 372 
E Construction 18 10 8 
F Wholesale and retail  27 8 19 
G Transportation 23 2 21 
H Hotel and catering industry 2 0 2 
I IT  41 26 15 
L Leasing and commerce service  17 12 5 
M Scientific research and technology service  1 1 0 
S Comprehensive 13 5 8 
 Overall 831 348 483 
 
Table 2-4 shows the comparison between the state- and family-owned firms in terms of 
several key firm characteristics. For state owned firms, 11 percent of the firms have CEO 
duality; for family firms, 26 percent of the firms have CEO duality. The differences in the mean 
and the median between state and family owned firms are statistically significant. The average 
board independence is slightly higher for family owned firms (0.37) relative to state-owned firms 
(0.33). In my sample, state owned firms also tend to be bigger, but less profitable than family 
owned firms. In addition, both state and family owned firms are highly concentrated with a mean 
ownership concentration of 41.79 percent for state owned firms, and 34.43 percent for family 
owned firms. The same patterns generally also hold when for median differences.  
 Table 2- 4: Contrast between State Owned and Family Owned Firms 
Firm variables 
Mean Difference  Median Difference 
Family State t-statistic  Family State t-statistic 
CEO duality 0.26 0.11 8.38  0.00 0.00 8.56 
Board independence 0.37 0.36 0.89  0.33 0.33 -1.09 
Firm size 7.91 8.83 -16.71  7.77 8.61 -10.34 
ROA 5.54 4.46 4.17  5.30 3.82 6.56 
Ownership 
concentration 34.43 
41.79 
-10.98  30.74 43.11 -10.81 
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The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test is used under the null of equality in medians.Table 2-5 
presents descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix. Foreign market entry is my dependent 
variable, with a mean of 0.07, implying that there is roughly a 7 percent likelihood of a firm to 
enter one of the 47 locations in my sample. Institutional quality, my key independent variable, is 
generally not highly correlated with the other country-level variables. The highest correlations 
are with GDP growth (-0.65) and cultural distance (0.64). I also report variance inflation factors 
(VIFs) for each independent variable. The average VIF is only 1.6 indicating that 
multicollinearity is not a concern in this study. 
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Table 2- 5: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variables  Mean  S.D. VIF  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Entry 0.07 0.25   1.00 
          
   
 Ownership concentration  38.84 14.13 1.21  0.01 1.00 
         
   
 Firm size 8.43 1.35 1.46  0.10* 0.34* 1.00 
        
   
 ROA 5.00 3.84 1.20  0.02* 0.01 -0.06* 1.00 
       
   
 Current Ratio 18.89 21.30 1.53  -0.01 -0.11* -0.42* 0.39* 1.00 
      
   
 AGE 11.98 3.96 1.15  0.00 -0.25* -0.06* -0.10* -0.14* 1.00 
     
   
 Log(GDP) 25.69 1.19 1.55  0.07* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03* -0.03* 1.00 
    
   
 GDP growth 3.91 2.46 2.52  -0.08* 0.00 -0.02* -0.01 -0.02 0.06* -0.48* 1.00 
   
   
 Log(distance)  8.80 0.64 1.24  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11* -0.24* 1.00 
  
   
 Natural resources  7.76 11.82 1.48  -0.03* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.43* 0.29* -0.04* 1.00 
 
   
 High technology 13.78 12.70 1.47  0.11* 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.22* -0.16* -0.30* -0.21* 1.00    
 Cultural dist. 2.23 1.29 2.43  0.05* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20* -0.60* 0.13* 0.12* -0.02 1.00   
 CEO duality 0.20 0.40 1.12  0.00 -0.08* -0.22* 0.09* 0.28* -0.09* 0.02* -0.02* 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00  
 Board independence  0.37 0.05 1.13  0.00 0.19* 0.23* -0.01 0.01 -0.22* 0.02* -0.02* 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.07* 1.00 
 Institutional quality  0.36 0.88 2.63  0.14* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39* -0.64* 0.14* -0.06* 0.31* 0.66* 0.00 0.00 1.00 
VIF stands for the variance inflation factor. * p<0.05 
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2.5.2 Statistical Interpretation 
Following standard practice, I begin by reporting the estimated coefficients and their 
associated standard errors. However, as in all non-linear models, the coefficients in logit-type 
models do not directly correspond to marginal effects. This makes direct interpretation of the 
results much more difficult. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that my hypotheses 
concern the sign and significance of the interaction effects between institutional quality and the 
moderator variables, while the interaction term (INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY * MODERATOR) 
in a non-linear model does not represent a cross-partial derivative, as it does in a linear 
regression model (Ai and Norton, 2003). Therefore, the estimated coefficient for the interaction 
term and their associated standard errors do not convey any direct information about the 
magnitude, or the statistical significance of the interaction effects of interest. 
To address these issues, I follow Ai and Norton (2003) (among others) and calculate the 
appropriate marginal effects. Specifically, I evaluate the sign and statistical significance of the 
moderator variable’s marginal effect on the relationship between institutional quality and foreign 
market entry probability. The marginal effect of a change in both interacted variables 
(institutional quality and the moderator) is equal to the cross-partial derivative of the probability 
of foreign market entry with respect to institutional quality, and then with respect to the 
moderator variable (sees Eq. (5) in Wiersema and Bowen, 2009). 
In the next section, I briefly discuss the sign and significance of the control variables, and 
the validity of the sub-sample approach (family vs. state). The statistical tests for the 
hypothesized interaction effects are discussed in the following section. 
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2.5.3 Estimation Results – Baseline 
Table 2-6 provides the results for the random-effects logit model (3) estimated separately 
for state- and family-owned firms. I report results for four different specifications: 1) main 
effects for institutional quality, 2) interaction terms for CEO duality, 3) interaction terms for 
board independence, and 4) both main and interaction terms included jointly.  
For the country-level variables I can see that state- and family-controlled firms have 
significant differences in terms of their preferences for several country-level variables. Family-
controlled firms are less likely to enter host countries with a large market size and high reserves 
of natural resources, while state-owned firms are more likely to enter such host countries. 
Moreover, state-owned firms are less likely to enter culturally distant countries, while the 
variable is insignificant for family controlled firms. The only country-level variable that both 
types have similar preferences over is high technological assets. These results highlight how 
different the two types of firms are in terms of their preferences for country-level attributes, 
which provides further justification for my sub-sample split. More importantly, the sub-sample 
approach solves the endogeneity problem that would otherwise arise as a result of the omitted 
variable problem.  
At the firm level, firm size is significantly and positively related to the probability of 
foreign market entry for both types of firms, as bigger firms have more resources and incentives 
to go abroad. Ownership concentration is not significant for either family- or state-controlled 
firms, indicating that the proportion of shares by the controlling shareholder does not influence 
the firm’s likelihood of entering foreign markets. Firm performance is insignificant for both 
family- and state-controlled firms, which means that for Chinese firms, even firms with poor 
performance are equally likely to invest abroad. Organizational slack, as measured by the current  
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 Table 2- 6: Random Effects Binary Logit Model 
 Family firms  State owned firms 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Institutional quality 0.611*** 0.471*** -1.456** -1.256*  0.755*** 0.793*** 1.368*** 1.484*** 
 (0.105) (0.112) (0.652) (0.655)  (0.099) (0.101) (0.474) (0.481) 
CEO duality   -0.706***  -0.691***   0.574*  0.512 
  (0.252)  (0.259)   (0.343)  (0.342) 
Institutional quality* 
CEO duality  
 0.557***  0.475*** 
 
 -0.319*  -0.343* 
  (0.173)  (0.176)   (0.187)  (0.188) 
Board independence   -3.697 -2.338    -3.886 -3.481 
   (2.514) (2.557)    (2.385) (2.395) 
Institutional  
quality*Board 
independence 
  5.648*** 4.776*** 
 
  -1.645 -1.846 
   (1.769) (1.794)    (1.244) (1.254) 
Ownership 
concentration  
0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005 
 
-0.009 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Firm size  0.574*** 0.575*** 0.582*** 0.587***  0.315*** 0.321*** 0.383*** 0.384*** 
 (0.108) (0.107) (0.109) (0.108)  (0.074) (0.074) (0.079) (0.078) 
ROA 0.014 0.011 0.014 0.010  0.004 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Current Ratio 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003  0.011* 0.012* 0.013** 0.013** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Age -0.014 -0.015 -0.012 -0.012  -0.005 -0.000 -0.010 -0.006 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Log(GDP) -0.123* -0.120* -0.123* -0.120*  0.278*** 0.278*** 0.279*** 0.278*** 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072)  (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
GDP growth -0.033 -0.034 -0.031 -0.032  0.005 0.004 0.007 0.006 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039)  (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
log(DISTANCE) 0.099 0.100 0.099 0.101  0.060 0.060 0.060 0.061 
 (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116)  (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.097) 
Nature resources  -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.027***  0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
High technology  0.023*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.024***  0.013*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Cult. Distance  -0.079 -0.076 -0.077 -0.075  -0.189*** -0.190*** -0.188*** -0.190*** 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069)  (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
Fixed effects          
  Industry YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
log-Likelihood -
1,175.034 
-
1,168.766 
-
1,169.470 
-
1,164.647 
 
-
1,574.437 
-
1,571.364 
-
1,571.589 
-
1,568.652 
Chi-squared 172.60 177.19 178.58 182.32  231.69 235.74 237.02 240.89 
N 5,885 5,885 5,885 5,885  6,797 6,797 6,797 6,797 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
ratio, is positive and significant only for state-controlled firms, which means that state-controlled 
firms are more likely to invest spare resources in foreign market entry. Firm age is insignificant 
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in all specifications. The proportion of independent directors on board are not significant for 
family and state owned firms, but the effects are both negative. For family controlled firms, CEO 
duality decreased the probability of foreign market entry; in state controlled firms, CEO duality 
increases the probability of foreign market entry.  
Hypothesis 1 suggests that institutional quality has a positive and significant impact on the 
probability of foreign market entry both for state- and family-owned firms. The results in Table 
2-6 provide preliminary evidence that the coefficient on institutional quality is positive and 
significant at the 1 percent level for both state and family owned firms. In order to properly 
evaluate the statistical significance and economic magnitude of institutional quality, I evaluate 
the marginal effect of a 1 Std. Dev. increase in institutional quality (corresponding roughly to the 
difference between Vietnam and the United States) on the foreign market entry probability (see 
Table 2-7: Panel A). First, I estimate the Marginal Effect estimated at the mean values of the 
independent variables (aka the Marginal Effects at Means, or MEM). These impacts imply a 2.0 
(3.2) percent increase in entry probability for family (state) firms, which are economically 
important when compared against the average probability of foreign entry, which is 5.9 and 6.8 
percent for family and state-owned firms respectively. These effects are also statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level or better, which provides direct confirmation for Hypothesis 1. 
A potential drawback with the MEM is that it conceals a considerable degree of variation. 
Since the marginal effect in logit-type models depends on all model variables through the foreign 
market entry probability (
𝜕𝑃𝑖,𝑗
𝜕𝐼𝑄𝐴𝐿𝑗
= 𝑏1𝑃𝑖,𝑗(1 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑗)), I can also summarize the entire distribution 
of marginal effects estimated at the observed values of the independent variables. Specifically, I 
report the average, median, 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentile of the distribution for the marginal effect. The 
average marginal effect at observed values is considerably larger than the MEM impacts (0.020 
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vs 0.026 for family firms and 0.032 vs. 0.036 for state owned firms), while the median values are 
almost identical to the MEM impacts, implying that the distribution is positively skewed. The 
marginal effects range from 0.005 to 0.067 for family-controlled firms at the 5
th
 and 95
th
 
percentiles, and from 0.006 to 0.093 for state-controlled firms.  
 Table 2- 7: Evaluating the Significance of the Direct and Interaction Effects 
PANEL A: Direct effect, i.e. the marginal effect 
𝝏𝑷𝒊,𝒋
𝝏𝑿
 
Sample 
Marginal Effect 
at Means 
(MEM) 
[z-statistic] 
for MEM 
Marginal Effect using variables at observed values 
Mean Median P05 
P95 
Family 0.020*** [5.48] 0.026 0.020 0.005 0.067 
State 0.032*** [6.49] 0.036 0.029 0.006 0.093 
PANEL B: True interaction effect, i.e. the marginal effect 
𝝏𝑷𝒊,𝒋
𝝏𝑿 𝝏𝒁
 
Sample 
Moderator 
variable (Z) 
Marginal 
Effect at 
Means 
(MEM) 
[z-
statistic] 
for MEM 
Marginal Effect using variables at observed values 
Mean Median P05 P95 
Family 
CEO duality 
0.019*** [3.11] 0.024 0.019 0.003 0.065 
State -0.018** [2.19] -0.020 -0.016 -0.050 -0.004 
Family Independent 
board 
0.148*** [2.68] 0.256 0.139 -0.002 0.912 
State -0.143** [2.16] -0.159 -0.126 -0.413 -0.024 
Note: MEM is calculated at the sample means of the independent variables. 
2.5.4 Estimation Results – Evaluating the Interaction Effects 
The first step in evaluating the hypothesized interaction effects is to examine whether the 
signs of the estimated interaction terms are correct. As I already discussed earlier, the 
significance of the interaction term is, by itself, not meaningful because the true interaction effect 
depends non-linearly on the estimated coefficient for the interaction term as well as the main 
effect for the moderator variable (sees Eq. (5) in Wiersema and Bowen, 2009).  
Table 2-6 show the coefficient estimates for the interaction terms INSTITUTIONAL 
QUALITY * BOARD INDEPENDENCE (Column 3 and 7) and INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY * 
CEO DUALTY (column 2 and 6). The interaction terms are both positive for family-controlled 
firms, and negative for state-controlled firms. These results provides preliminary support for 
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Hypotheses 2 and 3, which suggest that family- (state) owned firms with high board 
independence are more likely to enter countries with high (low) institutional quality; as well as 
support for Hypotheses 4 and 5, which suggest that family- (state) owned firms with CEO duality 
are more likely to enter countries with high (low) institutional quality. In column 4 and 8 of 
Table 2-6, I add all variables simultaneously, and the results are largely unchanged from before.  
Next, I evaluate the statistical significance of the interaction effects. Specifically, I evaluate 
the sign and statistical significance of the moderator variable’s marginal effect on the 
relationship between institutional quality and probability of market entry. The marginal effect of 
a change in both interacted variables (institutional quality and the moderator) is equal to the 
cross-partial derivative of the probability of foreign market entry with respect to institutional 
quality, and then with respect to the moderator variable (see Eq. (5) in Wiersema and Bowen, 
2009). As in the previous section, I use the marginal effect at means (MEM) in evaluating the 
overall significance. I also report the marginal effects at observed values of the independent 
variables (see Table 2-7, panel B). This is particularly important for the interaction between 
institutional quality and board independence because both variables are continuous, in which 
case the true interaction effect can theoretically switch signs for different observations.  
The true interaction effects INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY*CEO DUALITY and 
INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY*BOARD INDEPENDENCE (based on the estimates in columns 2, 
3, 6 and 7 in Table 2-6) are positive and highly significant for family-owned firms, and negative 
and significant for state-owned firms. This evidence provides direct confirmation of Hypotheses 
2 to 5. Moreover, the interaction INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY*BOARD INDEPENDENCE is 
positive (negative) for about 95
 
percent of the observations for family- (state-owned) firms. For 
the handful of observations where the interaction effect switches signs, the effects are never 
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statistically significant. It is also interesting that for state-owned firms the true interaction effect 
between institutional quality and board independence is highly significant despite the fact that 
the coefficient estimate on the interaction term is insignificantly different from zero (see Table 2-
6). This is possible because in non-linear models where both interacted variables are continuous 
(as in the case of institutional quality and board independence), the true interaction effect is 
determined by the product of the coefficient for the moderator variable and interaction term 
(b1*b4 see Eq. (3)) (Wiersema & Bowen, 2009). In my case the coefficient for the moderator 
variable (BOARD INDEPENDENCE, b1) and the interaction term (INSTITUTIONAL 
QUALITY*BOARD INDEPENDENCE, b4) are both negative, which explains why the product of 
the two is negative and why true interaction effect remains significant. This example also 
highlights the importance of analyzing the appropriate marginal effects, rather the coefficient 
estimates. 
In order to better evaluate the economic magnitude of the true interaction effects, I report 
the marginal effect of institutional quality evaluated at specific values of the moderator variables 
(see Table 2-8). Specifically, I compute the marginal effect of a 1 Std. Dev. increase in 
institutional quality (corresponding roughly to the difference between Vietnam and the United 
States) on the foreign market entry probability for values of CEO duality at 0 (= chairman and 
CEO have separate roles) and 1 (= same roles). These impacts, estimated at the sample means of 
the independent variables, are 1.8 and 2.8 percent for family firms and 3.1 and 2.1 for state 
owned firms. The impacts are even greater if I evaluate the marginal effects at the average value 
of the observed values. In this case, the impact of institutional quality on foreign market entry is 
almost twice as large for family-owned firms where the CEO is the chairman of the board, but 
only half as small for state owned firms with CEO duality.  
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Similarly, for the interaction effect between institutional quality and board independence, I 
compute the marginal effect of a 1 Std. Dev. increase in institutional quality for values of board 
independence at low, medium and high values (33, 37 and 42 percent). The low and high values 
correspond to minus and plus one Std. Dev. from the mean, and the medium value corresponds 
to the mean value of board independence. These impacts, estimated at the sample means of the 
independent variables, are 1.5, 2.2 and 2.8 percent for family firms and 4.0, 3.1 and 2.4 percent 
for state owned firms. The results in this section are consistent with the hypothesized interaction 
effects. Specifically, the impact of institutional quality on the probability of foreign market entry 
is considerably stronger for higher levels of board independence and for CEO duality among 
family-owned firms, while the opposite relationship holds for state-owned firms. 
Table 2- 8: Economic Magnitude of the Moderator Variable Z on the Marginal Effect of 
Institutional Quality on the Probability of Foreign Market Entry 
Sample 
Value of 
Z 
Marginal 
Effect at 
Means (MEM) 
[z-statistic] 
for MEM 
Marginal Effect using variables at observed values 
Mean Median P05 P95 
PANEL A: Z = CEO duality [Low = 0; High = 1] 
Family 
Low 0.018*** [4.32] 0.023 0.019 0.006 0.057 
High 0.028*** [5.13] 0.041 0.027 0.005 0.119 
State 
Low 0.031*** [6.02] 0.039 0.032 0.007 0.094 
High 0.023* [1.74] 0.026 0.023 0.009 0.049 
PANEL B: Z = Board independence [Low = mean - 1 SD; Med = mean; High = mean + 1 SD] 
Family 
Low 0.015*** [3.28] 0.018 0.015 0.005 0.044 
Med 0.022*** [5.99] 0.030 0.022 0.006 0.078 
High 0.028*** [6.36] 0.041 0.028 0.005 0.121 
State 
Low 0.040*** [5.24] 0.050 0.041 0.010 0.112 
Med 0.031*** [5.97] 0.039 0.032 0.008 0.090 
High 0.024*** [4.54] 0.030 0.024 0.006 0.071 
 * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 a
 MEM is computed at the sample mean values for the independent variables. 
 
I also highlight the marginal effects in graphical format. Figure 2-2 shows the probability 
of foreign market entry (Y-axis) for different values of institutional quality when all other 
independent variables are held fixed at their sample means.  
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Figure 2-2A shows the interaction effect between institutional quality and ratio of 
independent directors on board for family- and state-controlled firms. In family-controlled firms, 
the slope of the curve representing a higher ratio of independent directors on board (plus one 
standard deviation) increases much faster than the curve representing a lower ratio of 
independent directors (minus one standard deviation), indicating that board independence 
enhances the positive impact of institutional quality on the probability of market entry. In state-
controlled firms, the curve representing a higher ratio of board independence is much flatter, 
indicating that higher representation of independent directors reduces the positive impact of 
institutional quality and the probability of market entry.   
Figure 2- 2: Interactions of Institutional Quality, Board Structure, and Firm Ownership on the 
Probability of Foreign Market Entry 
A. Representation of independent directors on board  
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B. CEO duality  
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Figure 2-2B shows the interaction effect between institutional quality and CEO duality for 
family- and state-controlled firms. For both family- and-state controlled firms, institutional 
quality increases the firm’s probability of market entry. In family-controlled firms, the curve 
representing a CEO duality of 0 is much flatter than the curve representing a CEO duality of 1, 
indicating that CEO duality enhances the positive impact of institutional quality on the 
probability of foreign market entry. In contrast, for state-owned firms, the slope for the curve 
representing a CEO duality of 0 grows much faster when institutional quality increases, 
indicating that CEO duality reduces the positive impact of institutional quality on the probability 
of foreign market entry. However, at each level of institutional quality, firms with CEO duality 
have a higher likelihood of foreign market entry unless the institutional quality of the host 
country is very high. 
2.5.5 Robustness Tests  
A potential concern with my estimation methodology is that it relies on a cross-section of 
firms, where the independent variables are calculated based on average values over the 2004-
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2013 period. Another possibility is to use sub-samples. The potential disadvantage of increasing 
the number of observations in the choice set is that the rare events problem described in King 
and Zeng (2001) becomes a more serious concern. The rare events problem leads to downward 
biased coefficient estimates and inflated standard errors. The latter reduces the power of 
evaluating the significance of the true marginal effects, which depend non-linearly on all 
estimated coefficients in the model (Ai & Norton, 2003). In order to obtain a reasonable balance 
between short sample periods and high entry probabilities, I calculate the independent variables 
based on average values over two sub-periods (2004-2008 and 2009-2013). In this case the 
decrease in the foreign market entry probability is not too severe; the entry probability is 6.85 % 
in the cross-sectional sample, and 3.97 % in the pooled sample with two cross-sections. 
I re-estimate the random-effects logit model (Eq. (5)) on the pooled cross-sectional 
sample. In order to account for the higher incidence of foreign market entries during the latter 
time-period (2009-2013), I include a dummy variable that takes the value one for this time-
period. The results are omitted for brevity, but they are available from the authors. As before, the 
interaction terms INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY*BOARD INDEPENDENCE and INSTITUTIONAL 
QUALITY*CEO DUALITY remain positive for family owned firms, and negative for state-owned 
firms. Similarly, the true interaction effects remain highly significant and positive for family 
owned firms. For state-owned firms the true interaction effects remain negative, but only the 
interaction term with board independence is significant. The insignificance of CEO duality for 
state-owned firms is not that surprising, given that the differences in risk-preferences between 
the politically appointed CEO (representing the risk-neutral state) and the independent directors 
(representing both the risk-neutral state and the moderately risk-averse minority shareholders) 
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are not that large. Otherwise the economic magnitude of the effects is largely unchanged from 
before.  
To further ensure the robustness of my results, I also redo all of the tests with a different 
measure for institutional quality. This alternate measure, EFI, is based on two components from 
the economic freedom index constructed by the Heritage Foundation: rule of law and control for 
corruption (Meyer et al., 2014). All of the results are largely unchanged with this measure of 
institutional quality, and are therefore omitted for conciseness. 
2.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I adopt an agency perspective to study how conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and managers among emerging economy MNEs affect the firms’ FDI location 
choice. My findings support the notion that the governance structure of the firm plays an 
important role in influencing the FDI location choice, extending previous arguments (Ellstrand et 
al., 2002; Ramasamy et al., 2012). Supporting my hypotheses, I find that family-owned firms 
with boards composed of a higher proportion of independent directors and characterized by CEO 
duality are more likely to invest in countries with good institutional quality. In contrast, state-
owned firms with such board characteristics are more likely to enter countries with poor 
institutional quality.  
I make two noteworthy contributions. First, I add to the literature on the governance 
structure of the firm and its internationalization (Bhaumik et al., 2009; Datta et al., 2009; 
Filatotchev et al., 2007) by being one of the first to analyze how the ownership of the firm 
interacts with the internal governance mechanisms to determine FDI location choice. As I 
mentioned before, some studies have discussed how the board of directors affects FDI (Datta et 
al., 2009; Ellstrand et al., 2002); while others have analyzed differences between family- and 
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state-owned firms in FDI location (Filatotchev et al., 2007; Ramasamy et al., 2012). The first 
stream of research focuses on the traditional agency issue in the advanced economy context, 
where the major conflict is between shareholders and managers. The second stream of research 
focuses on the objectives and risk preferences of the controlling shareholder. However, the 
identity of the controlling shareholder (family vs. state) affects the nature and severity of the 
agency conflicts in emerging economy firms. Therefore, the impact of the internal control 
mechanism, such as board independence and the separation of CEO and chair positions, have 
different influences on FDI location choice between family- and state-owned firms.  
Second, I contribute to agency theory by integrating two approaches: the first highlights 
the problems that arise from conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders and the 
various mechanisms designed to mitigate these conflicts (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976), while the second focuses on the differences in objectives and agency problems 
among firms with different dominant shareholders (Cuervo-Cazurra, Inkpen, Musacchio, & 
Ramaswamy, 2014; Young et al., 2008). I explain how these two agency relationships interact 
with each other in the context of emerging market firms. Differing from the Anglo-Saxon 
context where the arguments for agency theory were initially developed, emerging economies 
are characterized by underdeveloped institutional environment and concentrated ownership, 
which results in novel agency problems (Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Young et al., 2008). In 
addition, some assumptions embedded in the agency theory do not hold across contexts; 
differences in objectives and risk preferences of shareholders and managers in emerging markets 
lead to the modification of some of the traditional agency arguments.  
My second chapter adds to the literature on the internationalization of emerging economy 
firms. In the current literature, there are seemingly contradictory findings on whether emerging 
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economy firms are more or less likely to invest in countries with worse institutional quality 
(Buckley, Clegg, et al., 2007; Li et al., 2012). I suggest that the contradictory predictions actually 
indicate that the positive relationship between institutional quality of host country and the 
probability of foreign market entry is moderated by firm’s risk preferences, political capabilities, 
strategic motives and government affiliations (Buckley, Devinney, & Louviere, 2007; Cuervo-
Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Holburn & Zelner, 2010; Li, Li, & Shapiro, 2012; Meyer, Ding, Li, & 
Zhang, 2014). I extend this stream of literature by focusing on the moderating role of corporate 
governance on the firm’s selection of host countries.  
2.6.1 Limitations and Future Research Opportunities  
There are a number of areas that future research could explore further. First, my findings 
are generalizable to other emerging economies, although not all of them. Numerous studies have 
found that China and other emerging economies share similar features in terms of corporate 
governance such as underdeveloped institutional environments, concentrated ownership, ultimate 
owner, and relationship based governance mechanisms (Claessens et al., 2000; Dharwadkar et 
al., 2000; Luo & Tung, 2007; Young et al., 2008), and that governance reforms such as minimum 
requirement on independent directors achieve similar effects among emerging economies (Black 
& Kim, 2012; Black & Khanna, 2007; Liu et al., 2015). Nevertheless, there are variations among 
emerging economies (Ramamurti, 2012). Future studies could test the relationship between 
governance structures and internationalization strategies in other emerging economy countries, 
and compare the differences and similarities due to variations of institutional environment among 
emerging economies.  
Second, the firms in my sample have relatively few foreign market entries. Because of 
the limited number of entries over the sample period and the relative static nature of the 
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governance variables, I cannot test my hypotheses with panel data. Therefore, my analysis 
mainly captures the impact of the cross-sectional differences in governance among firms on 
foreign market entry, but it cannot explain the influences of changes in ownership structure or 
board composition within the firm on foreign market entry. In addition, my findings may be 
limited to firms with relatively low international experience, as the accumulation of international 
experience may affect the directors and the executives’ perspective of risk in foreign market 
entry.  
Third, in this chapter, I have discussed the goals and risk preferences of key corporate 
governance actors (i.e., top managers, board of directors, family/state controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders) in emerging economies, but I have limited information about the 
characteristics and behaviors of board members and top executives such as their political 
connections, functional background, international experience, and dissent behavior. Future 
research might examine how these characteristics of the board and top management affect firms’ 
risk preference and objectives in overseas expansion.  
The implication of this study for policy makers is that corporate governance practices 
from advanced economies do not necessarily work in the same way in emerging economies, as 
the effectiveness of the practices is contingent upon the complex institutional environment under 
which they are embedded (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Young et al., 2008). In addition, the 
impact of these practices on firm strategies also differs depending on the type of the firm, as the 
goals and risk preferences of the owners and shareholders are different for state- and family-
owned firms (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). Therefore, before adopting any systems or practices, 
policy makers should pay more attention to the institutional configurations that enable the 
corporate governance systems.   
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CHAPTER THREE: TOP MANAGEMENT TEAM’S POLITICAL CONNECTIONS, 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONALIZATION  
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Scholars in finance and management have examined the impact of political connections 
on the firm’s performance and its strategies based on a variety of theoretical frameworks, 
including the resource dependence theory, the institutional theory, the network theory, the 
government intervention perspective, and the upper echelon perspective (Chin, Hambrick, & 
Trevino, 2013; Faccio, 2006; Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007; Li & Liang, 2014; Meyer, Ding, Li, & 
Zhang, 2014; Zheng, Singh, & Mitchell, 2015). However, in the field of international business 
(IB), the impact of political connections on the firm’s internationalization strategies is relatively 
underexplored with a few exceptions (Liang, Ren, & Sun, 2014; Pan, Teng, Supapol, Lu, Huang, 
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& Wang, 2014). In this chapter, I seek to examine the relationship between top managers’ 
political connections and the firm’s degree of internationalization in emerging economies.  
Generally, the literature suggests that political connections affect organizational 
outcomes by providing resources in various forms (e.g., bank loans, relaxed regulatory oversight, 
privileged access to information, and political expertise), or by exposing the firm to government 
intervention (e.g., imposing government policies and political goals) (Faccio, 2006; Fan et al., 
2007; Pan et al., 2014; Shi, Markoczy, & Stan, 2014). These studies’ focus on the economic or 
social costs and benefits of political connections neglects the influence of political connections 
on the top manager’s personal values. Top managers’ personal values refer to “a broad tendency 
to prefer certain states of affairs over others” (Hofstede, 1980: 19). Drawing from the upper 
echelons perspective, I propose that top managers build political connections through current or 
past experience of holding positions in the government, and this personal political engagement 
should directly reflect the manager’s personal values (Chin et al., 2013; Hambrick & Mason, 
1984; Li & Liang, 2014). Top managers’ personal values can enter into the firm’s strategic 
choices through direct channels, in which the executives select choices that are more closely 
aligned with their values; or indirect channels, in which the values guide the executives in 
information gathering, filtering and interpretation (Chin et al., 2013; Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  
I differentiate between two types of political connections by the top manager: i) executive 
connections established by working in the executive branch of the government and ii) legislative 
connections established by holding a representational appointment in the legislative branch of the 
government. These political activities reflect different personal values. I argue that top managers’ 
executive connections in privately-owned firms indicate that these managers are more receptive 
to changes and willing to take on more risks, whereas top manager’s executive connections in 
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state-owned firms indicate that they emphasize stability and authority (Ralston, Terpstra-Tong, 
Terpstra, Wang, & Egri, 2006). In contrast, top managers’ legislative connections reflect the 
manager’s pro-social value (Li & Liang, 2014) or consciousness of honor (Xia, 2008), that is, the 
motive to serve and benefit the larger society.  
Integrating the personal value view with the resource and state control views of top 
managers’ political connections, I propose that these two types of top managers’ political 
connections can influence the firm’s degree of internationalization by bringing different levels of 
resources to the firm, exposing the firm to different levels of state control and injecting different 
personal values of the top managers into the firm’s strategic choice. After comparing the three 
mechanisms, I argue that top managers’ executive connections facilitate the firm’s 
internationalization, whereas legislative connections hinder the firm’s internationalization. 
Furthermore, I propose two moderators for the relationship between top managers’ 
political connections and the firm’s degree of internationalization: type of ownership and the 
dual role of chief executive officer (CEO) and chairman of the board. In the existing literature, 
state ownership is sometimes considered as an indicator of political connections of the firm (e.g., 
Berkman, Cole, & Fu, 2010; Cui & Jiang, 2012). However, I argue that it is necessary to 
differentiate between the top managers’ political connections and the firm’s state ownership. The 
former is established through managers’ self-initiatives, whereas the latter is granted because of 
affiliations (Pan et al., 2014). In addition, the literature has shown that top managers in privately-
owned firms are also politically connected (Li & Liang, 2014; Peng & Luo, 2000; Wang & Qian, 
2011). Therefore, in this chapter, I conceptualize type of ownership as a moderator that affects 
the strength and direction of the relationship between top managers’ political connections and the 
firm’s degree of internationalization through its influence on resources, state control, and 
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managers’ personal values in the organization. Specifically, I argue that top managers’ executive 
connections have a positive impact on the firm’s degree of internationalization in privately 
owned firms, but the effect is much weaker in state owned firms; top managers’ legislative 
connections have a negative impact on the firm’s degree of internationalization in privately 
owned firms, but the effect is much weaker in state owned firms.  
CEO duality refers to the practice that the CEO of the firm also chairs the board 
(Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994). CEO duality reduces the constraints of the board over the top 
managers’ actions, and thereby provides greater freedom for top managers to inject their personal 
values into the firm’s strategic choices (Chin et al., 2013). Therefore, I predict that CEO duality 
strengthens the relationship between top managers’ political connections and the firm’s degree of 
internationalization. These conjectures are confirmed by an empirical test based on a dataset of 
100 publicly traded Chinese firms over the 2004-2013 periods.  
My third chapter makes two major contributions. First, it contributes to the current 
literature on top managers’ political connections by drawing from the political science literature 
and adding the upper echelons perspective. I propose that top managers’ political connections 
affect firm strategies through three interrelated mechanisms: i) resources, ii) cost, and iii) 
managers’ personal values. The third mechanism is very important, as it explains why managers 
with executive connections and managers with legislative connections have opposing preferences 
for internationalization; and why existing research that does not differentiate between the types 
of managers’ political connections has not found any significant relationship between top 
managers’ political connections and the firm’s degree of internationalization.  
Second, I contribute to the upper echelons literature. IB scholars have found that top 
management team’s demographic attributes, composition and international experience affects the 
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firm’s internationalization strategies (Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001; Lee & Park, 2008; Reuber 
& Fischer, 1997; Tihanyi, Ellstrand, Daily, & Dalton, 2000). I add to this literature by 
establishing the relationship between top managers’ political connections and the firm’s degree 
of internationalization. In addition, I extend the upper echelons literature by examining the 
impact of top management team on internationalization in an emerging collective and socialist 
country.  
3.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In the finance and management literature, the political connections of the firm are an 
important topic because political connections have significant implications for firm value and 
firm strategies. Political connections have previously been operationalized in two major ways. 
First, scholars have considered the connections of top managers or directors of the board to the 
government or political parties as an indicator of the firm’s political connections (e.g., Faccio, 
2006; Zheng, Singh, & Chung, 2015). Second, scholars have operationalized the ownership by 
the state as an indicator of the firm’s political connections (e.g., Berkman, Cole, & Fu, 2010; 
Meyer, Ding, Li, & Zhang, 2014). Although political connections can be empirically measured in 
different ways, the theoretical underpinnings for the relationship between political connections 
and organizational outcomes are similar. Therefore, my literature review on political connections 
includes a discussion of managers’ political connections as well as the role of state ownership.  
3.2.1 Political Connections 
Previous studies have investigated the impact of political connections on the firms 
organizational outcomes, based on a variety of theoretical perspectives such as the resource 
dependence theory, the institutional theory, the resource based view, or network theory (Cui & 
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Jiang, 2012; Meyer et al., 2014; Peng & Luo, 2000; Zheng, Singh, & Mitchell, 2015). I classify 
these theoretical frameworks into two groups: the first focuses on the economic or social benefits 
of political connections, and the second focuses on economic or social costs of political 
connections to the firm.  
First, managers’ political connections can yield major economic and social benefits to the 
firm (Faccio, 2006; Shi et al., 2014). Political connections help the firm to gain privileged access 
to information and resources such as investment opportunities, bank loans and government 
subsidies (Claessens, Feijen, & Laeven, 2008). Political connections also help the firm to deal 
with regulatory processes and oversight, which ultimately influences firm value (Faccio, 
Masulis, & McConnell, 2006; Faccio, 2006; Fisman, 2001). For instance, Fonseka, Yang, Tian, 
& Colombage (2015) find that the political connections facilitate the approval for private equity 
placement from the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission. Zheng, Singh, & Chung (2015) 
argue that political connections make it easier for a firm to exit through sell-offs, because such 
connections can substitute for market intermediation, influence politicians’ administrative fiat, 
and provide resources. In the IB literature, Pan et al. (2014) find that firms with political 
connections are less influenced by the heterogeneity of host-country institutional environment in 
their subsidiary ownership decision, because the munificent resources associated with political 
connections increase the firm’s tolerance for risk in its foreign investments. 
Second, managers’ political connections also generate economic and social costs to the 
firm via government interventions. Scholars generally agree that government intervention is 
detrimental for firm value, because governments or related politicians may impose political and 
social goals on the firm and extract rents from the firm (Berkman et al., 2010). Fan, Wong, and 
Zhang (2007) find that firms with politically connected managers perform worse than firms 
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without such political connections because they increase the information asymmetry between 
shareholders and managers. Moreover, managers and directors of the board in politically 
connected firms tend to consist of bureaucrats rather than professional managers. Chen, Sun, 
Tang and Wu (2011) provide further evidence that government intervention through state 
ownership or the appointment of politically connected managers in the listed firm hurts the 
firm’s investment efficiency.  
In the IB literature, Liang, Ren, and Sun (2014) argue that managers’ political 
connections are an indicator of state control, and firms with political connections are more likely 
to respond to government policies. Since the Chinese government encourages firms to go abroad, 
firms with politically connected managers are more likely to follow the government’s policy and 
thus have a higher degree of internationalization. Cui and Jiang (2012) argue that state-owned 
firms are more likely to conform to home-country regulatory restrictions on outward FDI. 
As the literature review so far indicates, the conceptualization of managers’ political 
connections as benefits or costs to the firm is the dominant view in the existing literature. This 
view is largely based on neoclassical economics, the resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978) or the institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), which either considers 
managers as rational optimizers or views managers as being constrained by the external 
environment with little impact on firm strategy. However, this view neglects that managers build 
political connections through current and past experience of holding positions in the government; 
and this personal political experience should also be viewed as a reflection of their personal 
values (Chin et al., 2013; Li & Liang, 2014). Managers’ personal values refer to “principles for 
ordering consequences or alternatives according to preference” (Hambrick & Mason, 1984: 
p.195). 
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The upper echelons theory argues that managers’ personal values can influence the 
organization’s decision making process (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Managers’ values can affect 
the strategic choices of the firm either indirectly, by influencing managers’ selection and 
interpretation of information; or directly, by serving as the principles for managers to evaluate 
the merits and appropriateness of the actions and decide whether to take the actions (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). Recently, researchers have examined the importance of the manager’s political 
ideology on the firm’s organizational behavior. For instance, Chin, Hambrick, and Trevino 
(2013) find that the CEO’s political ideologies affect her managerial actions. Liberal CEOs value 
social justice, economic equality, planned social change, and controls over markets; while 
conservative CEOs value individualism, property rights, and free markets. This suggests that 
liberal CEOs are more likely to engage in initiatives promoting corporate social responsibility 
relative to conservative CEOs. Li and Liang (2014) are among the first to examine political 
connections from the upper echelons perspective in the Chinese context. They argue that 
successful entrepreneurs may seek political appointments in the legislative body of the 
government for pro-social motives, which implies that their political engagement is a way to 
fulfill their ultimate goal of serving the larger community or society. These studies have shown 
that top managers’ political activities are indications of their personal values.  
In sum, I propose that political connections can influence firm performance and the 
firm’s strategies in three different ways: via i) economic costs and benefits, ii) social costs and 
benefits, and iii) managers’ personal values. These three mechanisms are interrelated. When 
discussing the implications of different types of political connections on firm value and 
strategies, it is important to synthesize the total effect of political connections through all three 
mechanisms, instead of focusing on one mechanism while ignoring the other channels.  
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3.2.2 Determinants of Internationalization  
Internationalization refers to the strategies that a firm uses in order to expand its sales or 
production across different countries or regions. Internationalization increases the level of 
uncertainty and complexity of the firm, but it also increases the opportunities for creating 
economies of scale, economies of scope, accessing new resources and knowledge, and reducing 
transactions costs (Hitt, Tihanyi, Miller, & Connelly, 2006; Nachum, Zaheer, & Gross, 2008).  
The traditional theories of MNEs generally suggest that firms should have an ownership 
advantage to overcome the liability of foreignness and succeed in foreign markets (Buckley & 
Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1988, 1998; Zaheer, 1995). In support of this argument, empirical 
research has shown that intangible resources such as R&D investment, human capital, social 
capital, and other indicators of firm competitiveness (such as firm size and performance) are 
positively associated with international diversification (Hitt, Bierman, Uhlenbruck, & Shimizu, 
2006). However, there is an ongoing debate in the literature as to how emerging economy firms 
can afford to go abroad (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012). Most emerging economies do not have such 
firm specific advantages. Hennart (2012) argues that some local firms in emerging economies 
have access to a home country-specific advantage (e.g., monopoly control of critical resources), 
which they can use to finance their intangible-asset seeking internationalization. Since the 
government is in control of the allocation of the most critical resources (Pan et al., 2014; Shi et 
al., 2014), I suggest that top managers’ political connections are an invaluable asset that 
facilitates the internationalization of emerging economy firms.  
The firm’s degree of internationalization is also determined by the firm’s motives to 
expand overseas. Liang et al. (2014) argue that the level of state control in the firm, which is 
reflected by top managers’ political connections, is positively associated with the firm’s degree 
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of internationalization because state-controlled firms are more incentivized to comply with the 
home country government’ policy to go global. However, the authors do not find a significant 
relationship between top managers’ political connections and the firm’s degree of 
internationalization. I suggest that the government intervention perspective might be useful for 
understanding the relationship between top managers’ political connections and the firm’s degree 
of internationalization. 
The upper echelons perspective has been extended to explain the firm’s international 
diversification. Prior findings suggest that elite education, younger age, heterogeneity and 
international experience of the top management team are associated with higher levels of 
internationalization, because these factors reflect the top management team’s risk propensity, 
cognitive base, and capability to process diverse information and access to resources (Carpenter 
& Fredrickson, 2001; Reuber & Fischer, 1997; Tihanyi et al., 2000). However, these studies have 
not examined the importance of political ideology and/or the connections of top executives on 
the firm’s degree of internationalization. Recent studies have shown that the top managers can 
imprint their personal political values into the organizational decision making process (Chin et 
al., 2013; Li & Liang, 2014). Top managers’ political values might have an even stronger role in 
organizational outcomes in emerging economies because managers need to frequently interact 
with political actors, and managers have more discretional power due to weak governance (Shi et 
al., 2014). I suggest that top managers’ personal values (as reflected by their political 
engagement) have an impact on the firm’s degree of internationalization.  
Integrating the literature on political connections and the antecedents of 
internationalization, I examine the impact of two types of top managers’ political connections 
(executive and legislative connections) on the firm’s degree of internationalization. Executive 
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connections and legislative connections bring different types of resources to the firm, expose the 
firm to different levels of government intervention, and imprint different managerial values on 
the firm’s decision making process. I propose that top managers’ executive connections are 
positively associated with the firm’s degree of internationalization, whereas top managers’ 
legislative connections are negatively associated with the firm’s degree of internationalization. 
Moreover, I conjecture that this relationship is moderated by state ownership, because the 
ownership structure affects the level of resources of the firm, the degrees of government 
intervention in the firm and the extent to which managers’ personal values can enter into firm’s 
strategic choices. In addition, drawing from the upper echelons literature, I also conjecture that 
CEO duality moderates the relationship between top managers’ political connections and the 
firm’s degree of internationalization, since CEO duality increases the managers’ discretional 
power over the firm’s strategic decisions. The theoretical model of this chapter is depicted in 
Figure 3-1. 
 Figure 3- 1: TMT Political Connections and Firm’s Degree of Internationalization 
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3.3 HYPOTHESES 
3.3.1 Top Management Team’s Political Connections and Internationalization  
Drawing on the existing literature, I differentiate between two types of political 
connections that top managers establish through their personal interactions with political actors: 
executive and legislative connections (Li & Liang, 2014; Pan et al., 2014; Zheng, Singh, & 
Chung, 2015). The reason is that these two types of political connections invovle different type 
of persons and different types of responsibilities. Executive connections are established if the top 
manager has worked, or is currently working in the executive branch of the government, such as 
in the state council and its affiliated ministries and bureaus, and in provincial and local 
governments. Top managers with executive connections are full-time civil servants, and they are 
directly connected to government agencies that respobile for allocating resources and regulating 
business activities (Zheng, Singh, & Chung, 2015).  
Legislative connections are established if a top manager holds representational 
appointments in political councils such as the People’s Congress (PC) or the People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (PPCC). These connections are different from the western context, such 
as in the U.S., where a representative position in the legislative branch of the government is a 
full-time job with the responsibility to introduce bills and resolutions, offer amendments and 
serve on committees. In China, most deputies of the PC or PPCC are part-time representatives 
who have full-time jobs and are not paid by the government except for the standing committee of 
the congress. The major responsibilities of the PC include revising the constitution, making or 
revising criminal, civil or other basic laws overseeing government operations, and electing 
government officials (Pan et al., 2014). The PPCC is a political advisory body that consists of 
non-party members and delegates from a range of political parties. Its main responsibility is to 
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monitor the implementation of laws and regulations, and to advise the community party and the 
government regarding important political, economic, cultural or social issues. However, in 
practice the representatives are rubber stampers that do not have any real power (Truex, 2014). 
In contrast, the membership in the PC or PPCC provides the representative legitimacy to take 
actions on social issues. For instance, deputies of PC or PPCC have introduced proposals such as 
banning smoking in public areas, raising automobile safety standards, and including certain type 
of diseases under the coverage of social insurance. Truex (2014) find that during the 2008-2010 
period, 29.4 percent of CEO deputy proposals at the national congress are on business 
environment and regulatory conditions, 15.8 percent on raising incomes/employment, and 10.1 
percent on environment protection. In summary, a representative position in the wester context 
entails real legislative power, while in the Chinese context representatives have more limited 
legislative power and instead provide awareness of important social issues, and bring legitimacy 
for taking action on social issues.  
I argue that these two types of political connections have different influences on the 
firm’s degree of internationalization because these connections are associated with different 
types/levels of economic and social costs and benefits to the firm, as well as different personal 
motives/values of top managers.  
3.3.2 Executive Connections  
In this section I consider three different channels through which executive connections 
can affect the firm’s degree of internationalization. Table 3-1 provides an overview of the 
hypothesized relationships. Additional details are provided below. 
Resources. The executive branch of the government is in control of allocating critical 
resources and implementing government regulations. Zheng, Singh, and Chung (2015) find that 
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executive connections can facilitate the firm to exit through sell-offs. They argue that executive 
connections are valuable to the firm because in emerging economies the executive branch of the 
government has substantial power to allocate resources and issue licenses and permits for 
business activities. Through executive connections, firms can reduce information asymmetry and 
transaction costs, influence regulatory processes, and obtain support from government related 
sectors. Applying the same logic, I argue that managers’ executive connections are valuable for 
the firm’s international expansion. Firms with executive connections can obtain privileged 
information on overseas markets or investment opportunities, have more relaxed bureaucratic 
procedures for export or investment to foreign markets, and receive financial support from the 
government or state-owned banks.  
Hennart (2012) notes that emerging economy firms can afford to go abroad not because 
they have a superior firm-specific advantage, but rather because local firms can derive significant 
gains from the monopoly control of critical resources in the home country through their 
connections to the government. These resources can then be used to accumulate capital and 
finance the firm’s intangible-seeking investments abroad. Therefore, executive connections can 
contribute to the firm’s internationalization in terms of both resources and capital.   
State control. Liang et al. (2014) argue that managers’ executive connections reflect state 
control over the firm. Because the Chinese government encourages firms to go abroad, 
politically connected managers are more likely to cater to government policies and engage in 
internationalization. However, their findings show that managers’ political connections are not 
significantly related to the firm’s degree of internationalization. The state tends to appoint 
government officials as top managers in publicly listed state-owned firms in order to maintain 
control of the firm (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Fan et al., 2007). In this case, executive connections in 
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state-owned firms reflect state control over the firm. However, top managers with executive 
connections in privately-owned firms tend to be government officials or civil servants that 
withdrew from the government to fully engage in business. This type of connections is therefore 
not a reflection of state control. In sum, based on the state control view, only executive 
connections in state-owned firms should be positively associated with degree of 
internationalization. In contrast, for privately-owned firms the impact of executive connections 
on the firm’s degree of internationalization cannot be explained by the government intervention 
argument.  
Managers’ personal values. Adopting the logic of the upper echelons theory, I anticipate 
that differences in top managers’ personal values will be reflected in the firm’s international 
diversification. Top managers’ executive connections are built through past or current experience 
of working in the government as a civil servant (Zheng, Singh, & Chung, 2015). In China, the 
job as a civil servant is informally called an iron rice bowl, which means that such jobs provide 
life-long job security. Despite its stability, this type of career is not suitable for everyone because 
of the constraints and hierarchies in the organization (Ralston et al., 2006). Some civil servants 
chose instead to withdraw from the government in order to engage in business activities in the 
private sector. Therefore, top managers with executive connections in privately-owned firms are 
more likely to be receptive to changes, willing to take risks and be more creative in their decision 
making process. Firms run by these types of politically connected managers are more likely to 
initiate strategic changes such as international diversification (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). In 
contrast, top managers with executive connections in state-owned firms are more likely to be 
government officials appointed by the state. Such managers tend to emphasize stability and 
authority; and to imprint such personal values on the organizational decision making process, 
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which makes them less likely to initiate strategic changes such as engaging in international 
diversification (Ralston et al., 2006).  
In terms of resources, executive connections provide resources for internationalization for 
both state and privately owned firms. In terms of state control,  top managers’ executive 
connections are not indicators of state control for privately-owned firms, but these connections 
indicate strong state control in state owned firms and increase the managers’ incentive to expand 
overseas. In terms of personal values, top managers’ executive connections in privately-owned 
firms have a positive impact on the firm’s degree of internationalization; but the effect is 
negative for state owned firms.  In sum, I expect a positive relationship between top managers’ 
executive connections and the firm’s degree of internationalization.   
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Top management team’s political connections to the executive branch 
of the government are positively associated with the firm’s degree of internationalization.  
 Table 3- 1: Summary of Hypotheses 
Political connections Ownership Mechanism Predicted effect 
Executive 
connections 
Private 
Resources +++ 
Government intervention Insignificant 
Managers’ personal values +++ 
Total effect +++ 
State 
Resources Insignificant 
Government intervention + 
Managers’ personal values - 
Total effect Insignificant 
Legislative 
connections 
Private 
Resources + 
Government intervention Insignificant 
Managers’ personal values --- 
Total effect -- 
State 
Resources Insignificant 
Government intervention Insignificant 
Managers’ personal values - 
Total effect Insignificant 
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3.3.3 Legislative Connections 
In this section I consider three different channels through which legislative connections 
can affect the firm’s degree of internationalization. Table 3-1 provides an overview of the 
hypothesized relationships. Additional details are provided below. 
Resources. The legislative branch of the government has the power to formulate national 
regulations, raise concerns over social and economic issues, and monitor government officials, 
but it does not have the direct access to national resources. However, this does not mean that 
legislative connections cannot contribute to resources that benefit the firm’s internationalization. 
Managers with representational appointments in the political council have high social status and 
they can raise their concerns over social justice or government policies in the annual conferences 
or media. In this case, government officials in the executive branch might grant firms led by 
highly influential managers privileged treatment, such as relaxed regulatory oversight (Pan et al., 
2014). Therefore, legislative connections is expected to have a much smaller positive impact on 
the firm’s degree of international relative to the impact of executive connections.  
State control. Liang et al. (2014) argue that managers’ legislative connections reflect state 
control over the firm. Since the Chinese government encourages firms to go abroad, politically 
connected managers are more incentivised to cater to government policies and engage in 
internationalization. However, deputies to the PC or the PPCC are not civil servants appointed by 
the state, but rather part-time representative members without an administrative ranking. They 
have their own jobs outside the government sector and are only required to attend the annual 
conference for a short period of time. Their career stability and promotion are not connected to 
the degree that they cater to government policies. Therefore, legislative connections cannot be 
considered as a measure for state control in the firm, which means that legislative connections 
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should not have an impact on the firm’s degree of internationalization through the channel of 
increased government intervention.  
Managers’ personal values. Li and Liang (2014) provide an alternative reason for why 
successful private entrepreneurs in China actively seek political appointments in the PC or the 
PPCC (i.e., the legislative connections). That is, to achieve the Confucian life goal. They propose 
that the ultimate goal of life for a person is to serve and benefit the larger society, after taking 
care of the immediate needs of herself and family members. Being a deputy in the PC or the 
PPCC provides individuals the legitimacy and channels to raise awareness of social issues and 
promote the interests of ordinary people (Xia, 2008).  
I argue that the concern over societal well-being, as an important personal value, can 
affect the firm’s degree of internationalization. First, prosocial values can affect the firm’s 
internationalization decision directly as top managers may prefer domestic over international 
investments because the former can better fulfill their motive for serving the society. Second, 
prosocial values can affect the internationalization decision indirectly when the prosocial values 
guide the top manager’s attention in information gathering, filtering and interpreting process 
towards the home market. Therefore, I conjecture that firms run by managers with legislative 
connections are less likely to increase their levels of internationalization. 
Given that the legislative branch of the government has marginal power over resource 
allocation or implementation of government regulations, the positive effect of legislative 
connections on internationalization through tangible or intangible resource provision is limited. 
Top managers’ legislative connections are not indicators of state control either. Instead, 
managers’ pursuit of such political appointments might be a reflection of the managers’ concern 
for the society wellbeing, and willingness to influence state policy (Li & Liang, 2014). Their 
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intensive attention on social issues and policies in the home country can actually affect their 
decision making in the organization, and lead to stronger emphasis on home market. Considering 
that legislative connections have a limited role in providing resources, but a strong role in 
influencing managers’ attention, I expect a negative relationship between legislative connections 
and the firm’s degree of internationalization.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Top management team’s political connections to the legislative 
branch of the government are negatively associated with the firm’s degree of 
internationalization. 
3.3.4 The Moderating Role of State Ownership  
Drawing from different perspectives, state ownership in the firm has been conceptualized 
as an indicator of state control (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Liang et al., 2014; Pan et al., 2014), an 
indicator of political support or resources (Berkman et al., 2010; Duanmu, 2014), or as an 
indicator of organizational structure and culture (Ralston et al., 2006). Liang et al. (2014) argue 
that state ownership is positively associated with the firm’s degree of internationalization, 
because state-owned firms are more likely to respond to the policy of the government for going 
abroad. However, other scholars argue that privately-owned firms are more likely to 
internationalize in order to escape from institutional constraints at home (Yamakawa, Peng, & 
Deeds, 2007). State-owned firms have privileged resources to support their internationalization 
(Duanmu, 2014). However, in terms of organizational culture, state-owned firms emphasize 
stability and predictability in strategy, and thus are less likely to engage in strategic changes such 
as international diversification; privately-owned firms are featured by entrepreneurship and 
creativity, which encourages international expansion (Ralston et al., 2006). Different 
perspectives can lead to opposite predictions for the relationship between state ownership and the 
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firm’s degree of internationalization. I therefore do not have a clear hypothesis for this direct 
relationship.  
Because state ownership can affect resources, goals, and managers’ personal values and 
relative power in the organization, I consider state ownership as a contextual factor that affects 
the role of managers in organizational strategic decisions. More specifically, I argue that the total 
impact of top managers’ political connections on the firm’s degree of internationalization is 
weakened by state ownership. Table 3-1 provides an overview of the hypothesised moderating 
relationships. 
3.3.4.1 Executive connection and state ownership  
Influence on resources. In privately-owned firms, top managers’ executive connections 
can bring valuable resources to the firm. However, in state-owned firms, the affiliation to the 
government already endows the firm with such resources (Cui & Jiang, 2012). In this case the 
resources that top managers’ political connections can bring in are redundant and thereby do not 
add incremental impact on the firm’s international expansion. This argument is supported by the 
existing literature, which shows that top managers’ political connections are more valuable for 
privately- owned than for state-owned firms in terms of resource provision in emerging 
economies (Li & Liang, 2014; Peng & Luo, 2000; Wang & Qian, 2011). Therefore, I expect state 
ownership to dampen the positive effect of top managers’ executive connections on the firm’s 
degree of internationalization. In other words, the positive impact of top managers’ executive 
connections should be much stronger in privately-owned than state-owned firms.   
Influence on state control. As I mentioned in section 3.3.2, in privately-owned firms, top 
managers’ executive connections do not represent state control; whereas in state-owned firms, 
top managers’ executive connections reflect state control. Given that top managers’ executive 
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connections align the interest of the top managers with that of the state, such managers are more 
likely to support the government’s “Go Global” policy. Therefore, I expect that state ownership 
to positively moderate the relationship between executive connection and the firm’s degree of 
internationalization.  
Influence on manager’s personal value. The upper echelons theory suggests that the 
relationship between the attributes of the top management team and the firm’s strategic outcomes 
is contingent upon the discretional power of the managers (Chin et al., 2013; Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1990). The discretional power of managers refers to the freedom that top managers 
are granted in taking actions within the organization (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). It can 
differ significantly because of firm ownership and national context (Crossland & Hambrick, 
2007). In China, state-owned firms are featured by a strong emphasis on hierarchical values 
(Ralston et al., 2006), which means that employees including top managers are expected to 
respect authority and to follow the rules and procedures. Therefore, there is limited space for top 
managers to impose their personal values into the firm’s strategic decisions. I expect top 
managers’ executive connections to have a limited impact on the firm’s degree of international 
diversification for state-owned firms. The majority of privately-owned firms that are publicly 
listed in China are family-controlled firms (Jiang & Kim, 2015), and close family members often 
assume key managerial positions (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). Because top 
managers are closely related to owners, they are granted more discretional power over the 
strategic decisions of the firm. Therefore, the personal values of top managers are more likely to 
be reflected in the firm’s decisions. I expect top managers’ executive connections to have a much 
stronger positive impact on the firm’s degree of international diversification in privately-owned 
than state-owned firms.  
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As I have mentioned earlier in section 3.3.3, in state-owned firms top managers’ 
executive connections are negatively associated with the firm’s degree of internationalization, 
because executive connections reflect the personal preference for stability and authority. In 
privately-owned firms, top managers’ executive connections are positively associated with the 
firm’s degree of internationalization, because such connections reflect managers’ receptivity to 
changes and willingness to take on more risks. Due to the limited managerial discretionary 
power in state-owned firms relative to privately-owned firms, I expect top managers’ executive 
connections to have a strong and positive impact on the firm’s degree of internationalization in 
privatively-owned firms and a relatively negligible negative impact in state-owned firms. 
In sum, both the resource and personal value perspectives support a stronger positive 
impact of top managers’ executive connections on the firm’s degree of internationalization in 
privately-owned than state-owned firms; whereas the state control view suggests that the positive 
impact should be stronger in state-owned firms than privately-owned firms. Considering the 
importance of the resource and personal values perspective, I propose that,   
Hypothesis 3 (H3): State ownership weakens the impact of top management team’s 
executive connections on degree of internationalization.  
3.3.4.2 Legislative connection and state ownership  
Influence on resources. Top managers’ legislative connections have a limited role in 
providing resources for international diversification, relative to top managers’ executive 
connections. Truex (2014) find that CEO’s appoinment in the national congress in China 
increases the firm’s return on asset by 1.5 percent in a given year, but the benefits are greatest for 
privately owned firms, and neglibile for state owned firms. State-owned firms can obtain more 
resources from their inborn connections with the government, which reduces the benefits that a 
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deputy seat can bring into the firm. Therefore, legislative connections have a positive effect on 
the firm’s degree of internationalization in privately owned firms, but the effect is neglibile in 
state owned firms.  
Influence on state control. As state control does not work as a major mechanism for the 
relationship between top managers’ legislative connections and the firm’s degree international 
diversification, I expect state ownership to have a negligible moderating effect of through this 
channel.  
Influence on manager’s personal value. Top managers’ legislative connections are a 
strong indicator of top managers’ pro-social values. Because legislative connections can take 
managers’ attention away from international markets, firms run by such domestically-focused 
managers should have a lower degree of internationalization. This relationship should be 
weakened by state ownership, which restricts the managers’ discretionary power in the firm.  
Although in terms of resources, legislative connections should have a stronger positive 
impact on the firm’s degree of internationalization in privately owned firms than in state owned 
firms, in terms of personal values legislative connections should have a stronger negative impact 
in privately owned firms than in state owned firms. Even though legislative connections can 
bring in more resources to the firm, top managers decide how to use the resources. A strong 
focus on domestic social issues arising from the appintment in the congress might guide 
managers’ attention toward the investment opportunities in the domestic market. Therefore, I 
expect that personal values have a stronger impact on the firm’s degree of internationalization 
than resources, and the negative association between legislative connection and the firm’s degree 
of internationalization is stronger in privately owned firms than state owned firms.  
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Hypothesis 4 (H4): State ownership weakens the negative impact of top management 
team’s legislative connections on degree of internationalization.  
3.3.5 The Moderating Role of CEO Duality  
CEO duality refers to the practice that the CEO also chairs the board (Finkelstein & 
D’Aveni, 1994). According to agency theory, when the CEO also assumes the position of the 
chair, the independence of the board is compromised (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 
1998), because the CEO can affect the board’s objective assessment of the management team by 
diverting the board’s attention. In the upper echelons literature, CEO duality has been used an 
indicator of managers’ relative power (Chin et al., 2013). The extent to which top managers can 
inject their personal values into the firm’s strategic choices is in proportion to their relative 
power in the firm (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990).  
The reason that I choose to examine the moderating effect of CEO duality in addition to 
state ownership is that, state ownership can moderate the main effect between top managers’ 
political connections and the firm’s degree of internationalization through three channels 
(resource, state control and managers’ personal value), whereas CEO duality moderates the main 
effect only through managers’ personal value. Therefore, the moderating effect of CEO duality 
can better demonstrate the effect of top managers’ personal values on the firm’s degree of 
internationalization.  
CEO duality leaves the top managers with greater latitude to inject their personal values 
into the strategic choices of the firm (Chin et al., 2013). When top managers have substantial 
power, their personal values can be more vividly reflected in the firm’s international expansion. 
Therefore, the positive impact of the top managers’ executive connection on the firm’s degree of 
internationalization should be stronger when the firm is characterized by CEO duality. In 
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contrast, top managers with legislative connections can better exert their pro-social value into the 
firm’s strategic decisions by hindering the firm’s international expansion when the firm is 
characterized by CEO duality, which results in stronger negative association between top 
managers’ legislative connections and the firm’s degree of internationalization.  
Hypothesis 5 (H5): CEO duality strengthens the impact of top management team’s 
executive connections on degree of internationalization.  
Hypothesis 6 (H6): CEO duality strengthens the impact of top management team’s 
legislative connections on degree of internationalization.  
3.4 METHODS 
3.4.1 Sample  
My sample contains the top 100 publicly listed firms in China based on their number of 
foreign subsidiaries in the year 2013. I have hand-collected the data on the characteristics of the 
top management teams and the firm’s foreign sales over the 2004-2013 periods. I study Chinese 
firms in order to test my hypotheses for two reasons. First, my theoretical model emphasizes the 
importance of different types of political connections on the firms’ internationalization strategies. 
In China, political connections play a significant role in shaping firms’ behavior and there are 
various types and levels of political connections (Shi et al., 2014). Second, China serves as a 
unique context to extend the studies on top management team. As Hambrick (2007) notes, most 
studies on top management team are conducted in the US context, but more research is needed in 
other national system in order to understand the importance of institutional or cultural factors on 
the role of top management teams. My sample starts in 2004 because foreign direct investment 
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by Chinese firms started to increase dramatically in this year.  After excluding years with 
missing values on foreign sales, my final sample consists of 646 firm-year observations.   
3.4.2 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the degree of internationalization, which is measured by the 
ratio of foreign sales to total sales. The IB literature suggest that the degree of 
internationalization should ideally be a composite measure that takes into account foreign sales, 
foreign assets, and geographic spread (Sambharya, 1996; Sullivan, 1994; Tihanyi et al., 2000). 
However, there are several factors that prevent me from using the composite measure. First, most 
firms in my sample have just started their internationalization process. For this reason I expect 
their focus to be on foreign sales rather than foreign production, which should occur at a later 
stage of internationalization. In addition, most firms do not report foreign assets in their annual 
reports when the foreign assets constitute only a marginal or negligible proportion of their total 
assets. Therefore, the ratio of foreign assets to total assets is not necessarily informative. 
Including it would also greatly reduce the sample size. Second, the correlation between the ratio 
of foreign sales to total sales and the geographic spread (measured by the number of foreign 
subsidiaries) in my sample is low, which means that I cannot combine these two measures as a 
single construct. I choose the ratio of foreign sales to total sales as the measure for degree of 
internationalization because it reflects the firm’s dependence on foreign markets.  
3.4.3 Independent Variables 
My key independent variables concern characteristics of the top management team, in 
particular the importance of political connections. The top management team includes the 
chairperson of the board, the chief executive officer (CEO), the chief operating officer (COO), 
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the president, senior vice-presents, and executive vice-presidents (Tihanyi et al., 2000; Wiersema 
& Bantel, 1992). By considering the characteristics of the entire top management team (rather 
than just the CEOs), I can more accurately capture the characteristics of the firm’s most 
important decision-makers.  
TMT executive connection is measured by the percentage of TMT members with 
political connections established through previous or current experience as a civil servant in the 
executive branch of the government (Zheng, Singh, & Chung, 2015). 
TMT legislative connection is measured as the percentage of TMT members with 
political connections established through the experience of holding a representational 
appointment in political councils such as the People’s Congress (PC) or People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (PPCC) (Pan et al., 2014; Zheng, Singh, & Chung, 2015).  
State ownership is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ultimate owner of the firm is the 
state or state-owned companies, and 0 otherwise. I classify privately controlled firms versus state 
controlled firms based on the identity of the ultimate controller (Berkman et al., 2010; Meyer et 
al., 2014). Privately controlled firms are controlled by non-government units, such as 
individuals, foreign companies, collective enterprises, and social entities. Firms controlled by the 
central or local government or its various entities with more than 20% of voting rights are 
classified as listed SOEs.  
CEO duality is a dummy variable, coded as one if the CEO is also the chairperson of the 
board and zero otherwise (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994).  
3.4.4 Control Variables  
I also include several control variables based on the international diversification 
literature. The first set of control variables concern TMT characteristics (Hitt, Tihanyi, et al., 
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2006; Tihanyi et al., 2000). TMT age is calculated the average age of the top management team 
members. TMT education level is calculated as the average education level of the top 
management team members. I classify education into five levels: 1 for an education below 
secondary education; 2 for a secondary education; 3 for a bachelor’s degree; 4 for a master’s 
degree; and 5 for a doctoral degree. TMT age heterogeneity is calculated as the coefficient of 
variation for age, defined as the standard deviation of the age of a top management team member 
divided by the average age of the top management team (Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996; 
Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). TMT educational level heterogeneity is similarly calculated as the 
coefficient of variation for the TMT members’ education level. TMT international experience is 
measured by a composite index. I calculate the percentage of TMT members with an education 
obtained overseas, and the percentage of TMT members who have worked abroad in a foreign 
company or in an international joint venture in China. I combine these two percentage measures 
together by first standardizing each measure, then summing them up and dividing by two (Lee & 
Park, 2008). 
The second set of control variables includes the following firm-specific variables: firm 
performance, firm size, organization slack, firm age, and prior (i.e., cumulative) international 
experience (Dunning, 1988; Hitt, Tihanyi, et al., 2006; Nachum et al., 2008). Firm size is 
measured by the log of total assets. Firm age is calculated as the difference between the year of 
foreign market entry and the founding year of the firm. Firm performance is measured by return 
on assets (ROA). Organizational slack is measured by the ratio of the difference between current 
asset and current liabilities to the total asset (Peng, Li, Xie, & Su, 2009). This ratio reflects the 
current resources that the firm can allocate to alternate use, such as foreign investment. 
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In calculating the firm-level variables, I discard any observations from the year of initial 
public offering (IPO), or the year following the IPO, to reduce the possibility of outliers. For 
instance, to become a publicly listed company in China companies must obtain the necessary 
approval from the government and meet certain performance thresholds leading up to the IPO 
year. The IPO events may therefore influence firm performance during the IPO year. Further, to 
reduce the incidence of outliers, I winsorize the firm-specific variables at the 1
st
 and the 99
th
 
percentile of the distribution.  
Finally, I control for industry fixed effects to account for observable differences among 
firms from different industries in terms of their degree of internationalization.  
3.4.5 Empirical Methodology 
My data contains observations both in the cross-section (across firms) and in the time-
series (over time). I therefore adopt a panel OLS regression framework to investigate the 
importance of TMT characteristics on the firm’s degree of internationalization as follows: 
                   𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎1 + 𝑏1𝑇𝑀𝑇 𝐸𝑋𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑏2𝑇𝑀𝑇 𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝑏3𝑇𝑀𝑇 𝐸𝑋𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑀𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅
+ 𝑏4𝑇𝑀𝑇 𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐼𝑆𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑀𝑂𝐷𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅
+  𝑏5𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝑏𝑘𝐼{𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 = 𝑘}
8
𝑘=1
+ e𝑖,𝑡                                                            (1) 
where Yi,t is firm i's degree of internationalization in year t, and MODERATOR is a dummy 
variable either for state control, or CEO duality. Note that all independent variables have been 
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lagged by one year. 𝐼{𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 = 𝑘} includes a set of industry dummies (one for each industry). I 
use robust (heteroscedasticity-consistent) standard errors. 
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Table 3- 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables  MEAN STD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
1. Proportion of Foreign sales 30.50 25.90 1.00 
             2. Cumulative Experience 3.87 4.56 0.12* 
             3. Firm Size 8.89 1.28 -0.21* 0.47* 
            4. Firm Performance 5.05 7.02 -0.16* -0.06 0.07 
           5. Organizational Slack 14.82 19.41 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 0.38* 
          6. Firm Age 13.03 4.66 0.08* 0.34* 0.20* -0.04 -0.10* 
         7. TMT Education heterogeneity 0.20 0.10 -0.02 -0.20* -0.20* 0.06 0.11* -0.04 
        8. TMT Age Heterogeneity 0.14 0.05 0.12* -0.04 -0.12* -0.03 -0.16* -0.05 0.14* 
       9. TMT Average Education  3.48 0.50 -0.14* 0.20* 0.30* -0.01 0.06 -0.00 -0.39* -0.25* 
      10. TMT Average Age 46.07 3.76 -0.06 0.09* 0.38* 0.01 -0.08* 0.13* -0.13* -0.06 0.16* 
     11. TMT International Experience 0.19 0.38 0.10* 0.05 0.12* -0.03 0.01 -0.17* -0.05 -0.09* 0.09* 0.09* 
    12. TMT Executive Connection 0.14 0.22 0.09* -0.17* -0.02 -0.03 0.06 -0.06 0.01 -0.07 0.01 0.18* -0.04 
   13. TMT Legislative Connection 0.06 0.13 -0.09* -0.10* -0.07 0.05 0.01 -0.03 0.18* 0.02 -0.14* -0.03 -0.01 0.11* 
  14. STATE 0.63 0.48 -0.06* 0.00 0.27* -0.07 -0.04 -0.07 -0.20* -0.21* 0.26* 0.39* -0.14* 0.19* -0.17* 
 15. CEO duality 0.16 0.37 0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.03 0.10* -0.06 -0.02 0.19 -0.02 -0.19* 0.21* -0.15* 0.02 -0.19* 
Note: Significance level is noted as   * p<0.05. 
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3.5 RESULTS 
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3-2 provides a correlation matrix for the dependent and independent variables used 
in this chapter. The correlations are all below 0.5 indicating that multicollinearity is unlikely to 
be a concern. I also confirm this using the VIF statistic (not reported). Since all of the VIFs are 
below 1.5 it is highly unlikely that that multicollinearity is a concern. 
3.5.2 Estimation Results – Impact of Control Variables 
Table 3-3 presents the results for the pooled OLS regression estimated over the full 
sample of privately-owned and state-owned firms. In the first column of Table 3-3, I examine the 
importance of the control variables. Starting from the most significant variables, I find that 
cumulative international experience has a positive and highly significant impact on the firm’s 
degree of internationalization. Next, firm size has a negative and significant coefficient implying 
that larger firms tend to have a lower degree of internationalization relative to smaller firms. This 
could be explained by the fact that smaller firms in China are more engaged in the 
internationalization process. Prior performance, measured by the firm’s return on asset of the 
previous year, has a negative and significant relationship with the degree of internationalization. 
This finding is particularly interesting, because the existing literature generally suggests that 
firms with better performance are more likely to engage in international expansion to further 
exploit their superior firm-specific capabilities and resources (Dunning, 1988). In contrast, my 
finding suggest that poor past performance may instead stimulate the top managers’ to search for 
international growth opportunities, thereby increasing the likelihood that the firm will increase 
its degree of internationalization in the following year (Cyert & March, 1963). Organizational  
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Table 3- 3: Results of Linear Regression Analysis with Full Sample 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cumulative Experience 1.567*** 1.601*** 1.640*** 1.534*** 
 (7.07) (7.21) (7.38) (6.93) 
Firm Size -7.097*** -7.157*** -6.643*** -7.048*** 
 (7.51) (7.66) (7.05) (7.44) 
Firm Performance -0.530*** -0.460*** -0.447*** -0.503*** 
 (3.60) (3.07) (3.02) (3.29) 
Organizational Slack 0.091 0.077 0.092 0.087 
 (1.55) (1.29) (1.55) (1.45) 
Firm Age 0.522* 0.535* 0.610** 0.613** 
 (1.82) (1.92) (2.24) (2.20) 
TMT Average Education -6.595*** -6.460*** -6.414*** -6.493*** 
 (2.84) (2.80) (2.86) (2.80) 
TMT Average Age -0.095 -0.206 -0.348 -0.097 
 (0.36) (0.77) (1.31) (0.36) 
TMT Education Heterogeneity -24.825** -20.851** -19.923* -21.304** 
 (2.41) (2.02) (1.90) (2.07) 
TMT Age Heterogeneity 66.320*** 69.574*** 81.234*** 75.100*** 
 (3.41) (3.58) (4.07) (3.77) 
TMT International Experience 8.601*** 9.042*** 8.319*** 7.227*** 
 (2.74) (2.87) (2.69) (2.58) 
TMT Executive Connections  7.772 61.528*** 5.921 
  (1.61) (4.00) (1.20) 
TMT Legislative Connections  -19.343** -25.684** -14.867* 
  (2.47) (2.29) (1.77) 
STATE=1   5.218*  
   (1.91)  
STATE * TMT Executive 
connection 
  -62.159***  
   (3.89)  
STATE * TMT Legislative 
connection  
  9.713  
   (0.60)  
CEO Duality    5.810 
    (1.52) 
CEO Duality * TMT Executive 
Connection 
   39.333** 
    (2.48) 
CEO Duality * TMT Legislative 
Connection  
   -50.546 
    (1.60) 
R
2
 0.257 0.266 0.291 0.276 
R
2
-adj 0.224 0.231 0.254 0.239 
N 648 648 646 646 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. T-statistics are based on robust standard errors.  Significance levels 
are noted as * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, respectively. 
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slack, as measured by the current ratio of the firm, is not significantly related to degree of 
internationalization. Firm age also has a positive effect on the degree of internationalization.  
Second, I discuss the effects of top management team characteristics on the firm’s degree 
of internationalization. Consistent with prior literature, the TMT age heterogeneity is positively 
associated with degree of internationalization; and the TMT international experience has a 
positive and significant impact on the firm’s degree of internationalization (Sambharya, 1996; 
Tihanyi et al., 2000). The average education level of the top management team is negatively and 
significantly associated with degree of internationalization. The average age of the TMT is 
insignificant. Top management team education level heterogeneity is negatively and significantly 
associated with degree of internationalization. These findings pose some challenges to the TMT 
literature based on the western context, and demonstrate the necessity to incorporate the 
institutional or cultural factors in examining TMT attributes and heterogeneity.  
3.5.3 Estimation Results – Hypothesized Effects 
Column 2 of Table 3-3 shows the main effect of top management team political 
connections. I find that TMT executive connections is positively but not significantly related to 
degree of internationalization (coefficient = 7.772, t-statistic = 1.61). In contrast, TMT legislative 
connection has negative and highly significant relationship with the degree of 
internationalization (coefficient = -19.343, p<0.05).  
To investigate the importance of political connections further, I include interaction terms 
between TMT political connections (executive and legislative separately) with state ownership in 
column 3, and interaction terms between TMT political connections and CEO duality in column 
4 of Table 3-3.  
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As column 3 of Table 3-3 shows, the direct effect of state ownership on the degree of 
internationalization is positive, but the effect is only marginally significant. This finding is not 
surprising. State-owned firms may have more resources that support their international 
expansion, but they are less incentivized to engage in international expansion as their domestic 
operation is supported and protected by the government. In contrast, private firms may lack the 
resources to internationalize, but their incentive to escape from the constraints of the home 
country is also likely to be strong. Therefore, the degree of internationalization is a balanced 
outcome of the capabilities and the willingness of the firm to internationalize.  
The relationship between TMT executive connection and degree of internationalization is 
significantly moderated by state ownership (coefficient = -62.159, p<0.01). More specifically, 
TMT executive connections significantly increase the firm’s degree of internationalization in 
privately-owned firms, but this effect is insignificant for state-owned firms. In contrast, while 
TMT legislative connections have a stronger negative impact on the firm’s degree of 
internationalization for privately-owned relative to state-owned firms, the interaction effect is 
statistically insignificant. Figure 3-2 presents a visualization of the interaction effect. From 
Figure 3-2A, we can see that TMT executive connections are positively associated with the 
firm’s degree of internationalization, but the slope is much steeper for privately-owned firms 
than for state-owned firms. Figure 3-2B shows that TMT legislative connections are negatively 
associated with the firm’s degree of internationalization, but the line is much flatter for state-
owned firms than privately-owned firms. 
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Figure 3- 2: Moderating Effects of State Ownership 
A. The Interaction of State Ownership and TMT Executive Connections on 
Internationalization  
 
 
B. The Interaction of State Ownership and TMT Legislative Connections on 
Internationalization 
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In order to study further how state and privately-owned firms differ in terms of their 
degree of internationalization and to control for potential endogeneity that arises due to the 
omitted variable bias, I perform sub-sample regressions for the two groups. These results are 
reported in Table 3-4. I classify privately controlled firms and state-controlled firms based on 
their identity of the ultimate controller, resulting in 247 firm-year observations for privately-
owned firms and 399 firm-year observations for state-owned firms. For privately-owned firms, 
Column P-2 of Table 3-4 shows that TMT executive connections have a positive and highly 
significant impact on the degree of internationalization, while TMT legislative connections have 
a significantly negative effect on the degree of internationalization. The economic magnitudes 
are also considerable. For privately-owned firms a one standard deviation increase in TMT 
executive connections is associated with a 13.4 % increase in the firm’s degree of 
internationalization. Similarly, a one Std. Dev. increase in TMT legislative connections is 
associated with 3.7 % decrease in the firm’s degree of internationalization. Moreover, the 
adjusted R-square increases from 27.2% to 33.2% in column P-2 when both measures for 
political connections are included in the model. In contrast to privately-owned firms, neither of 
the TMT political connection variables is significant for state-owned firms.  
Column 4 of Table 3-3 shows the main effect of CEO duality and its interaction effect 
with TMT political connections on the firm’s degree of internationalization. The direct effect of 
CEO duality is positive, but insignificant (coefficient = 5.810). Based on the organizational 
theory, CEO duality can facilitate internationalization because it makes the firm’s decision 
making process faster by clarifying the unit of command in the organization (Finkelstein & 
D’Aveni, 1994). In contrast, based on agency theory, CEO duality can hamper 
internationalization because CEO duality can make the firm more risk averse. Given that CEO 
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duality might have both negative and positive impact on internationalization, it is not surprising 
to find that the direct effect of CEO duality on the firm’s degree of internationalization is 
insignificant.  
 Table 3- 4: Results of the Sub-sample Analysis Based on Firm Ownership 
Variables (P-1) (P-2) (S-1) (S-2) 
Cumulative Experience 2.306*** 2.414*** 1.649*** 1.597*** 
 (5.69) (6.05) (5.88) (5.69) 
Firm Size -11.342*** -10.235*** -6.409*** -6.306*** 
 (6.71) (6.26) (4.90) (4.85) 
Firm Performance -0.613** -0.567** -0.365* -0.372* 
 (2.25) (2.43) (1.71) (1.67) 
Organizational Slack 0.081 0.095 0.036 0.040 
 (0.73) (0.89) (0.60) (0.64) 
Firm Age -0.185 -0.069 1.374*** 1.377*** 
 (0.38) (0.16) (3.89) (3.92) 
TMT Average Education -13.387*** -13.243*** 4.191 4.703* 
 (3.46) (3.56) (1.52) (1.80) 
TMT Average Age 0.325 0.067 -0.733** -0.696** 
 (0.57) (0.13) (2.11) (1.99) 
TMT Education Heterogeneity -5.835 -2.884 -59.180*** -54.298*** 
 (0.35) (0.18) (4.18) (3.68) 
TMT Age Heterogeneity 73.124** 79.076*** 77.180*** 82.543*** 
 (2.27) (2.77) (2.74) (2.94) 
TMT International Experience 5.161 4.367 8.026* 7.984* 
 (1.23) (1.11) (1.76) (1.75) 
TMT Executive Connection  59.848***  -3.604 
  (3.63)  (0.77) 
TMT Legislative Connection   -27.852**  -14.697 
  (2.24)  (1.44) 
R
2
 0.349 0.408 0.360 0.364 
R
2
-adj 0.272 0.332 0.317 0.318 
N 247 247 399 399 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
Note: The numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. T-statistics are based on robust standard errors.  Significance levels 
are noted as * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, respectively. 
 
My hypotheses are concerned with the moderating effect of CEO duality on the 
relationship between TMT political connection and the firm’s degree of internationalization. 
Column 4 of Table 3-3 shows that the interaction between TMT executive connection and CEO 
duality is positive and highly significant (coefficient=39.333, p<0.05). This suggests that the 
relationship between TMT executive connections and the firm’s degree of internationalization is 
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more than seven times stronger for firms with CEO duality (coefficient = 5.921 + 39.333), 
relative to firms without CEO duality (coefficient = 5.921). In contrast, the relationship between 
TMT legislative connections and the firm’s degree of internationalization is more negative for 
firms with CEO duality (coefficient = -14.867-50.546), relative to firms without CEO duality 
(coefficient = -14.867), but the difference is not statistically significant. Figure 3-3 presents a 
visualization of the interaction effect. From Figure 3-3A, we can see that the slope between TMT 
executive connection and the firm’s degree of internationalization is much steeper when CEO 
duality equals 1 than when CEO duality equals 0. Figure 3-3B shows that TMT legislative 
connection has a stronger negative effect when CEO duality equals 1 than when CEO duality 
equals 0.  
Figure 3- 3: Moderating Effects of CEO Duality 
A. The Interaction of CEO Duality and TMT Executive Connections on Internationalization 
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B. The Interaction of CEO duality and TMT Legislative Connections on Internationalization 
 
 
In order to better illustrate the moderating effect of CEO duality on the relationship 
between TMT political connection and the firm’s degree of internationalization and to control for 
potential endogeneity that arises due to the omitted variable bias, I perform sub-sample 
regressions for the two groups. These results are reported in Table 3-5. I divide the sample based 
on CEO duality, resulting in 105 firm-year observations for firms with CEO duality and 541 
firm-year observations for firms without CEO duality. Despite the small sample size for firms 
with CEO duality, TMT executive connections have a positive and significant impact on the 
degree of internationalization (coefficient=21.276, p<0.10) (see Column 4 of Table 3-5), while 
TMT legislative connections have a significantly negative effect on the degree of 
internationalization (coefficient=-68.431, p<0.05). The economic magnitudes are also 
considerable. For firms with CEO duality, a one standard deviation increase in TMT executive 
connections is associated with a 4.7 % increase in the firm’s degree of internationalization. 
Similarly, a one Std. Dev. increase in TMT legislative connections is associated with an 8.9 % 
decrease in the firm’s degree of internationalization. Moreover, the adjusted R-square increases 
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from 50.8% to 53.5% in column 4 when both measures for political connections are included in 
the model. In contrast to firms with CEO duality, neither of the TMT political connection 
variables is significant for firms that separate the roles of CEO and chair of the board.  
 Table 3- 5: Results of the Sub-sample Analysis Based on CEO Duality 
 CEO duality=0 CEO duality=1 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cumulative Experience 1.453*** 1.506*** 1.382** 1.333*** 
 (5.61) (5.78) (2.63) (2.67) 
Firm Size -6.028*** -6.075*** -6.783** -8.697*** 
 (5.78) (5.90) (2.44) (2.82) 
Firm Performance -0.516*** -0.449** -0.392 -0.601 
 (3.00) (2.52) (1.02) (1.64) 
Organizational Slack 0.155** 0.137** -0.224 -0.173 
 (2.40) (2.06) (1.45) (1.11) 
Firm Age 0.726** 0.723** 0.861 0.702 
 (2.18) (2.21) (1.51) (1.36) 
TMT Average Education -7.742*** -7.590*** 7.029 5.268 
 (3.10) (3.03) (0.71) (0.61) 
TMT Average Age -0.324 -0.413 0.993 1.103 
 (1.17) (1.47) (1.17) (1.37) 
TMT Education Heterogeneity -31.361*** -28.307** 42.236* 41.409* 
 (2.73) (2.42) (1.77) (1.79) 
TMT Age Heterogeneity 57.307*** 60.637*** 200.587** 174.973** 
 (2.79) (2.91) (2.60) (2.44) 
TMT International Experience 5.158* 5.541** 20.897** 10.339 
 (1.94) (2.10) (2.44) (1.12) 
TMT Executive Connections  6.683  21.276* 
  (1.34)  (1.90) 
TMT Legislative Connections  -11.722  -68.431** 
  (1.37)  (2.09) 
R
2
 0.270 0.275 0.621 0.651 
R
2
-adj 0.235 0.237 0.508 0.535 
N 541 541 105 105 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
 Note: The numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. T-statistics are based on robust standard errors. Significance 
 levels are noted as * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, respectively. 
 
State ownership can moderate the relationship between top managers’ political 
connections and the firm’s degree of internationalization by differentiating the impact of 
resources and top manager’s personal values in state and privately-owned firms. However, the 
moderating role of CEO duality is mainly through enhancing/reducing the influence of top 
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managers’ personal values in state and privately-owned firms. The significant moderating effect 
of CEO duality further confirms that the top managers’ personal value is an important channel 
between top managers’ political connections and the firm’s degree of internationalization.   
3.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In the literature, several perspectives have been used to study the impact of political 
connections on firm performance and strategies, such as the resource dependence theory, the 
institutional theory, network theory, the government intervention perspective, and the upper 
echelons perspective (Chin et al., 2013; Li & Liang, 2014; Meyer et al., 2014; Zheng, Singh, & 
Mitchell, 2015). This chapter examines the relationship between top management team’s 
political connections and the firm’s degree of internationalization through three potential 
channels: i) resources, 2) state control, and 3) managers’ personal value. Relying on data from 
100 public listed Chinese firms over the period 2004-2013, I find that the top managers’ 
executive connections have a positive impact on the firm’s degree of internationalization, 
whereas top managers’ legislative connections have a negative impact. Moreover, these effects 
are weakened both by state ownership and the separation of CEO and board chair positions. 
Specifically, top management team’s political connections in privately-owned firms have a 
significant effect on the firm’s degree of internationalization, but these political connections are 
insignificant for state-owned firms. Similarly, the association between top managers’ political 
connections and the firm’s degree of internationalization is significant for firms characterized by 
CEO duality, but the relationship is insignificant for firms that split the role of CEO and 
chairperson of the board.  
This chapter makes two major contributions. First, it contributes to the current literature 
on top managers’ political connections by theoretically arguing and empirically testing that top 
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managers’ political connection can exert an impact on the firm’s internationalization through the 
personal value channel. Theoretically, I also provide a more comprehensive view of the 
importance of top managers’ political connections by integrating the resource, state control and 
upper echelons perspectives. 
I differentiate between top managers’ executive and legislative connections. This is 
important because these two types of political activities reflect differences in the amount of 
resources available to the firm, the degree of state control, and the types of managers’ personal 
values. Top managers’ executive connections can provide critical resources such as monopoly 
rents that can facilitate internationalization (Hennart, 2012). State control over the firm through 
appointment of government officials in the firm is plausible for state-owned firms, but executive 
connections in privately-owned firms tend to be established through managers’ past experience 
of working in the government. This implies that these connections are not indicators of state 
control. Since executive connections are formed differently among state- and privately-owned 
firms, these connections are likely to reflect different personal values. Managers with executive 
connections in state-owned firms are more likely to emphasize stability and respect authority, 
while managers with executive connections in privately-owned firms tend to be more receptive 
to changes and willing to take risks. I argue that these differences in personal values are reflected 
in the strategic changes of the firm, such as in international diversification.  
In contrast, the legislative branch of the government has limited power over resource 
allocation (Zheng, Singh, & Chung, 2015), which is why these legislative connections cannot 
contribute much to internationalization in terms of resources. Legislative positions are only part-
time work, which does not confer any payment or administrative ranking. Therefore, top 
managers with representational appoints in the legislative branch of the government cannot be 
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viewed as being controlled by the executive branch of the government. In this case, legislative 
connections cannot be considered as an indicator of state control. Instead, these connections 
reflect the managers’ personal prosocial values, i.e., the desire to serve and benefit the society 
(Li & Liang, 2014). Prosocial values can directly affect the top manager’s decision regarding 
internationalization because individuals with prosocial values will prioritize the home market. 
Prosocial values may also indirectly affect the firm’s internationalization decisions, through the 
impact on the managers’ information gathering, filtering and interpretation of information.   
The significant moderating effect of state ownership and CEO duality provides further 
support to my conjecture that managers’ personal values is a major channel between top 
managers’ political connections and the firm’s degree of internationalization. The opposite 
effects of top managers’ executive and legislative connections on the firm’s degree of 
internationalization might explain why existing studies that do not differentiate between these 
two types of political connections have not found any significant relationship between top 
managers’ political connections and the firm’s degree of internationalization (Liang et al., 2014).  
Second, I contribute to the upper echelons literature. Drawing from the upper echelons’ 
perspective, IB scholars have found that top management team’s demographic attributes, 
composition and international experience affect the firm’s internationalization strategies 
(Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001; Lee & Park, 2008; Reuber & Fischer, 1997; Tihanyi et al., 
2000). However, recent findings in the upper echelons literature suggest that top managers’ 
political values can be injected into organizational decisions have not been incorporated into the 
IB field. I argue and provide empirical evidence supporting the idea that top managers’ political 
values affect the firm’s degree of internationalization. Moreover, the upper echelons literature 
suggests that the role of the top management team varies across different national contexts 
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(Crossland & Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick, 2007). My study is among the first to examine the 
impact of top managers’ political engagement on organizational strategies from an upper 
echelons perspective in an emerging economy context.  
This context extends the upper echelons literature in several ways. First, the western 
literature conceptualizes political ideologies in terms of liberal or conservative orientations (Chin 
et al., 2013), while China is featured by a different political system and ideologies. The 
communist party, as the ruling party in China, assigns members to the executive branch of the 
government, and to key managerial positions in state-owned firms. Meanwhile, individuals, 
especially non-party members or members of a range of non-ruling parties in China, seek 
representational appointments in the PC or PPCC to influence government policies and achieve 
their goal to benefit the larger society. These different ways of political engagement reflect 
different personal values associated with managers’ executive or legislative connections. Second, 
the upper echelons literature suggests that managerial discretion moderates the relationship 
between top management team attributes and organizational outcomes (Chin et al., 2013; 
Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). Drawing from the literature on corporate governance in 
emerging economies, I argue that the type of ultimate owner (state vs. private) affects the level of 
managerial discretion in the organization. Third, the previous literature on the links between top 
management team and international diversification find that top managers’ age, education, 
heterogeneity, and international experience affect the level of international diversification in the 
U.S. context, which is featured by strong individualistic orientation (Tihanyi et al., 2000). In 
contrast, my third chapter tests the relationship in the Chinese context, which is featured by a 
collective orientation. My results show that the top management team’s age, education level, 
international experience, and heterogeneity in age and education level significantly affect the 
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firm’s degree of international diversification. However, the direction of these effects is not 
always consistent with the predictions obtained in the U.S. context, and the effects differ 
significantly between privately and state-owned firms. These findings add to the emerging 
literature that investigates the impact of national contexts on the role of top managers in 
corporate strategies (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007; Qian, Cao, & Takeuchi, 2013).  
3.6.1 Limitations and Future Research Opportunities  
My results should be interpreted within the context of the study’s limitations. First, top 
managers’ political connections can be established through a variety of ways. Following the 
literature, I use the direct measures of formal connections that can be easily identified by 
checking the manager’s profile in the firm’s annual report or on the firm’s website. However, 
managers can be connected with political actors through various informal ways, such as by 
having a personal relationship with a government official, by being related to a government 
official, or by bribing a government official. It would, however, be very difficult to collect such 
data. It is also not clear to what extent these informal ties can contribute to firm’s resources 
(Faccio, 2006; Zheng, Singh, & Mitchell, 2015).  
 Second, I focus on the political connections of the top managers, because they are 
directly responsible for making and implementing the firm’s strategic changes. However, 
political connections of the firm can also be accumulated through board membership. Future 
research could investigate how board members’ political connections affect firms’ 
internationalization. In addition, future research can examine how top managers’ social 
background and industry experience affect the firm’s internationalization.  
Third, I measure the degree of internationalization based on the proportion of foreign 
sales to total sales. The unidimensional measure may fail to fully capture the breadth and depth 
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of the firm’s degree of internationalization for some types of firms. However, this should not be 
a serious concern. Most firms in my sample have just started their internationalization process, 
which is why I can focus on foreign sales rather than foreign production. In addition, the reason 
that most firms do not report foreign assets in their annual reports is that foreign assets constitute 
only a marginal or negligible proportion of their total assets. Therefore, the ratio of foreign sales 
to total sales largely captures the importance of foreign markets to the firm.  
Forth, following the upper echelons literature that uses observable demographic factors 
for top managers to capture their unobservable psychological process and cognitive base 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984), I use the type of political activities (observable) that top managers 
have engaged in as an indicator of their personal values (unobservable). Future research could 
use surveys or interviews to further understand managers’ personal values.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION 
My dissertation examines the role of corporate governance and political connections on 
emerging economy firm’s internationalization behavior. The first chapter examines the joint 
impact of two internal governance mechanisms (board structure and ownership structure) on the 
firm’s FDI location choice. The second chapter examines the impact of top managers’ political 
connections on the firm’s degree of internationalization, and the moderating effect of two 
internal governance mechanisms (board structure and ownership structure).  
In the first chapter, I find that emerging economy firms are more likely to invest in 
countries with better institutional quality than poor institutional quality. Family-controlled firms 
with boards composed of a higher proportion of independent directors and characterized by CEO 
duality are more likely to invest in countries with good institutional quality. In contrast, state-
controlled firms with such board characteristics are more likely to enter countries with poor 
institutional quality.  
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In the second chapter, I find that the top managers’ executive connections have a positive 
impact on the firm’s degree of internationalization, whereas top managers’ legislative 
connections have a negative impact. Moreover, these effects are weakened both by state 
ownership and CEO duality. Specifically, top management team’s political connections in 
privately-owned firms have a significant effect on the firm’s degree of internationalization, but 
these political connections are insignificant for state-owned firms. Similarly, the association 
between top managers’ political connections and the firm’s degree of internationalization is 
significant for firms characterized by CEO duality, but the relationship is insignificant for firms 
that split the role of CEO and chairperson of the board.  
This dissertation contributes to a better understanding of the role of government 
involvement in the firm’s internationalization (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 
2014). In the first chapter, I show that government as the controlling shareholder of listed firms 
is relatively risk neutral, and its risk preference enters into the firm’s FDI location decision 
through its influence over the board of directors and top managers. In the second chapter, I focus 
on the political connections of the top management team and demonstrate how top managers’ 
current or past working experience in the executive and legislative branch of the government 
affect the firm’s degree of internationalization through resource provision, government 
intervention and managers’ personal values.  
Both chapters contribute to the literature on corporate governance and 
internationalization by highlighting the importance of corporate governance actors (top 
management team, shareholders and board of directors) and internal governance mechanisms 
(board and ownership) on the firm’s internationalization decisions (Bhaumik et al., 2009; 
Buckley & Strange, 2010; Tihanyi et al., 2000). The first chapter explains the firm’s FDI 
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location choice based on an analysis of the risk preferences of shareholders and top managers 
and the monitoring role of the board. The second chapter confirms that top managers’ personal 
values can enter into the firm’s internationalization decision, and the extent to which top 
managers’ personal values affect firm’s internationalization is moderated by two governance 
mechanisms (state ownership and CEO duality).  
In addition, both chapters contribute to the theories of MNEs by demonstrating how the 
unique institutional environment of the home country affects the firm’s internationalization 
decisions (Contractor, 2013; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012; Luo & Tung, 2007). The traditional theories 
of MNEs argue that firms need to have ownership advantage to support their internationalization 
(Dunning, 1988; Rugman & Nguyen, 2014), but the internationalization of emerging economy 
firms is facilitated by factors such as home government support, entrepreneurship, and cultural 
traits (Contractor, 2013; Hennart, 2012). My dissertation shows that the institutional environment 
in emerging economies shapes the risk preferences of corporate governance actors and the 
monitoring role of the board, and shapes the incentives for managers to build and maintain 
political connections and the discretional power that managers have over the firm’s strategic 
decisions. Therefore, the influence of corporate governance and political connections on the 
firm’s internationalization is a reflection of the role of home country institutional environment on 
the firm’s internationalization.  
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